THE LABOR BOARD, THE COURTS, AND
ARBITRATION-A. FEASIBILITY STUDY
OF TRIBUNAL INTERACTION IN
GRIEVABLE REFUSALS
TO DISCLOSE *
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I
INTRODUCTION

As we have seen in the first two articles in this series, arbitration
is capable of providing needed "discovery" in the administration of
collective bargaining agreements. The arbitration tribunal is created
when the disputants mutually select their own decision-maker, responsible for a final and binding resolution of their dispute. His duty
is to provide judgment, informed by prudence and experience, at the
time when a resolution of the problem is of real and pressing importance
to the parties. If discovery procedures are to be effectively adapted
to arbitration, a viable system of interaction must be developed among
the arbitrators, the Board and the reviewing courts of appeals.
In 1957, in Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,1 the Supreme Court
laid the foundation for the allocation of decision-making responsibility
* This is the last of a series of three articles exploring the adaptability of existing
federal discovery procedures to labor arbitration in discovery situations occurring
during the terms of collective bargaining agreements. The first article illustrated the
recurrence of discovery situations affecting both employers and unions. Jones, Blind
Man's Buff and the NO W-Problems of Apocrypha, Inc., and Local 711-Discovery
Procedures in Collective Bargaining Disputes, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 571 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Blind Matz's Buff]. The second article explored various concerns
about the prospect of arbitral discovery and considered the use of federal law and
policy in support of arbitral discovery through proceedings under § 301 of the LaborIt conManagement Relations Act [hereinafter LMRA], 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
cluded that the national labor policy should include a commitment to arbitral discovery.
Jones, The Accretion of Federal Power in Labor Arbitration--The Example of Arbitral Discovery, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 830 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Accretion]. This
third and final article demonstrates the need for a disclosure remedy under the
National Labor Relations Act, the structural incapacity of the Labor Board to supply
it, and makes a proposal for effective interaction of the affected tribunals--courts, Labor
Board and arbitrators-in order to meet the need. My colleague, William Cohen,
gave me helpful criticism relative to the Federal Rules, but is to be absolved for any
trespasses I may have committed. Copyright @ 1967 by Edgar A. Jones, Jr.
t Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. A.B. 1942, Wesleyan
University. LL.B. 1950, University of Virginia. Member, Virginia Bar and National
Academy of Arbitrators. See Caveat au Douglas, Blind Man's Buff 571 n.* for my
compliance with Mr. Justice Douglas' suggestions in Law Review and Full Disclosure,
40 WASH. L. REv. 227, 228 (1965).
1353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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among these three major tribunals in the labor relations field. In
Lincoln Mills the Court directed the federal judiciary to fashion a body
of federal substantive law to be applied in actions under section 301
of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 2 which governs the enforce-

ment of collective agreements to arbitrate.
In the Steelworkers trilogy,3 in 1960, the Court committed to
arbitrators the initial assessment of alleged contract violations and the
formulation of responsive remedies. Under these cases, the arbitrator
"is to bring his informed judgment to bear in order to reach a fair
solution of a problem." ' The Court thought this to be a sound
allocation of the first-instance power to decide contractual disputes
because a "labor arbitrator performs functions which are not normal to
the courts; the considerations which help him fashion judgments may
indeed be foreign to the competence of courts." ' The arbitrator is not
limited to the same resources for forming a judgment as are the courts.
His "source of law is not confined to the express provisions of the
contract." 6
The reasoning of the Steelworkers cases was extended in 1964 in
John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston,7 which held that the arbitrators
should also have first-instance power to decide " 'procedural questions'
which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition ... , 8
More recently, in 1967, the Court in Acme Industrial9 related
the "institutional competency" of arbitration to the role of the Labor
Board in such a way as to require further development of the uses
of arbitration in the pursuit of national labor policy goals. The Court
reemphasized "the national labor policy favoring arbitration." It
observed that "the Board's threshold determination" was an exercise
of jurisdiction in a refusal-to-disclose case which "in no way threatens
the power which the parties have given the arbitrator to make binding
interpretations of the labor agreement." " Although that conclusion
2

LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).

3United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Co., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ; United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
4
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Co., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
Id.

7376 U.S. 543 (1964).
8Id. at 557.
!DNLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
The 1960 Steelworkers cases "dealt with the relationship of courts to arbitrators
when an arbitration award is under review or when the employer's agreeemnt to arbitrate is in question. The weighing of the arbitrator's greater institutional competency,
which was so vital to those decisions, must be evaluated in that context. The relationships of the Board to the arbitration process is of a quite different order." Id.
at 436. (Citation omitted.)
0 Id.at 438.
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was somewhat ingenuous, as we have seen," the Court was manifestly
concerned lest interaction with the Board unduly restrict the arbitrator's power to interpret the agreement.
As a result of the Lincoln Mills decision, collective bargaining
moved into a new phase of its evolution, requiring a new and
specialized exercise of creativity by the parties and their personally
selected arbitrators. This new requirement was that the parties either
join in fashioning the incidents of their own forum or have the courts
do it for (or to) them. Although Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in
Lincoln Mills,"2 was quite concerned lest this, in Dean Shulman's
phrase, "seriously affect the going systems of self-government," 13 what
the Court actually did was push the parties into their own negotiated
corners while leaving them free to negotiate their way out, either after
the fact of an arbitrator's decision or in anticipation of it. At frequent
intervals, the union or the employer can lawfully bargain to an impasse
during negotiations, and then resort to a strike or lockout, if either
one really wishes to get rid either of their system of judicially enforceable, voluntarily accepted arbitration or of any of the consequences of
a particular arbitration decision. If it be said that this is not a realistic
view of bargaining, that once incorporated in an agreement the substance of arbitration decisions are not, as a practical matter, readily
dislodged, the short answer must be that this symptomizes the existence
of the acceptance, not the rejection, of these decisions, and thus their
integration as part of the joint "intent" thereafter.
The history of the continued acceptability-indeed, the vigorous
growth--of arbitration confirms to a considerable extent the Court's
judgment in Lincoln Mills in contrast to that of Dean Shulman and
Mr. Justice Frankfurter. Yet it would be foolish not to recognize that
there remains much essential wisdom underlying the concerns expressed
by each of those astute students of labor law. That wisdom forms an
indispensable element of the basic premise of the analysis in this study.
It is that the prospect of bolstering the bargaining relationship is
markedly--one might almost say, exponentially-enhanced to the degree
that a final decision is rendered by a procedure which is under the immediate, joint control of the disputants. The more remote the tribunal
to which the decision is committed, the more extended becomes the
timespan prior to its finality. The more filtered by factors extraneous
to the bargaining relationship becomes the "informed" decision which
disposes of the issue, the less can it realistically be regarded as informed.
11 See Blind Man's Buff 582-83.

12353 U.S. at 463.

13 Shulman, Reason, Contract,and Law in Labor Relations, 68 H-Lv. L. REv. 999,

1024 (1955).
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Keeping in mind the "institutional competency" of arbitration
identified by the Court,14 it is the purpose of this article to examine the
Labor Board's response to refusal-to-disclose cases in order to develop
a theory for the interaction of the Board with arbitration in this area.
II
DISCLOSURE AND THE LABOR BOARD

A. The Board's Disposition of Refusal-to-Disclose Cases
There is no doubt that disclosure can be compelled during the
term of a collective bargaining agreement in labor disputes affecting
interstate commerce. The National Labor Relations Board can, and
often does, issue an order directing one party to bargain in good faith
by disclosing information requested by the other. But disclosure thus
achieved bears no resemblance to the remedy of "discovery." Discovery
is a NOW-remedy. It has evolved as a judicial mechanism to compel
timely disclosure of the evidentiary elements of the opposing claims
of litigants in pending actions. A major purpose is to bring the dispute
into sharp focus, encouraging, if not compelling, realistic settlement
efforts. But perhaps the ultimate purpose of discovery is to transform
trials from a process of evasion into one of realization in which the
facts of the case are more easily ascertained. As the Supreme Court
has stated, "[L]itigation is the pursuit of practical ends, not a game
of chess." 11 As true as that is of adjudication, it is much more so
of arbitration, since arbitration is the non-judicial means evolved over
the centuries whereby disputes may quickly be brought to a "friendly
and quyett end" by submission to the final and binding decision of
"gentlemen of the country" 18 selected by the disputants themselves,
rather than imposed on them.
The terms of collective agreements are generally far shorter than
the time required for adjudication of a contested lawsuit through the
available stages of trial and appeal. Their renegotiation cannot await
17
the outcome of litigation, nor can the parties' continuing relationship.
The time factor is particularly pertinent to discovery situations arising
during the terms of collective agreements. Time is then crucial; often
14 See note 9 supra. For my attempt to mark out the bounds of that "institutional
compentency," see Jones, Power and Prudence in the Arbitration of Labor Disputes:
A Venture in Some Hypotheses, 11 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 675 (1964).
15 City of Indianapolis v. Chase, 314 U.S. 63, 69 (1941) (Frankfurter, J.).
16 Quoted in J. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 168 (1960).
17 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 463 (1957)
dissenting).

(Frankfurter, J.,
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it is everything. It is apparent today that the typical remedy invoked
by a party aggrieved by a refusal to disclose information is a Labor
Board proceeding; the charge is failure to bargain in good faith. Yet
the Board's refusal-to-disclose cases show that resort to that tribunal
frustrates the hope of the wronged party for an effective remedy.
It takes nearly a year and a half, on average, for the Board to
issue a disclosure order. In almost half the cases another twelve to
eighteen months will elapse before the order is enforced in a court
of appeals."8 By that time, the discovery situation will long since have
been transformed into a bargaining cause cdlbre only to be concluded
by an order retaliatory in tone but of no remedial effect. At the end
of two or three years a chastising Board order will be tacked on a
plant bulletin board. But it will be obvious to the employees that this
is no real penalty. Any grievance concealed in the withheld information is apt by then to have been dissipated by the passage of time and
events. A Board order to disclose information may have its uses, but
"discovery" certainly is not one of them.
Chief Justice Warren has observed the necessity of a judicial
system in which "a case is litigated in its entirety in one system of
courts or the other, rather than sent back and forth like a shuttlecock." 19
That thought is certainly applicable to the interaction between arbitrators and the Board, since its judgment is reviewable in federal
circuit courts.
Aside from refusal-to-bargain disclosure orders, the Board has
disapproved of the use of inter-party discovery in connection with its
proceedings."0 It has taken the position that the section 10(b) 21
reference to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "clearly relates to
the introduction of evidence before the Board, and not to pretrial
privileges accorded parties to judicial proceedings." 2 But the need
for effective disclosure nonetheless exists.
Board and court decisions establish that the duty to bargain includes the duty to furnish sufficient information to bargain intelligently.
For an employer, this has been called an "affirmative statutory duty
to supply relevant wage data" to the union unless it "plainly appears
I 8 The data on which these statements are based is set forth in the appendix to this

article.
19 Quoted in Wright, The Federal Courts-A Century After Appomattox, 52

A.B.A.J. 742, 746 (1966).
20
See Miami Coca-Cola Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 456 n.2 (1954) ; Plumbers Local 100,
128 N.L.R.B. 398, 400 (1960) ; Walsh Lumpkin Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 294, 296 (1960).
21

National Labor Relations Act [hereinafter NLRA] § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b)

(1964).
22 Del E. Webb Constr. Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 377 n.2 (1951) (no merit in exception
to trial examiner's denial of motion to vacate hearing on ground that respondent was
entitled, under FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a), to take deposition of charging party).
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irrelevant." ' The claim that such information is confidential and
can be withheld has long been rejected by the Board and the courts. 4
Employers are required to furnish information concerning names of
unit employees, rates paid each employee,"8 rate history, classifications,
duties, dates of hire, merit increases and their recipients.2 " The right
to the information cannot be waived unless the waiver is expressed in
"clear and unequivocal language." 27
Former NLRB Chairman Guy Farmer, in a much-quoted concurrence in 1954 in Whitin Machine Works,2" observed that "a clearcut rule relating to this issue is desirable." 29 He felt that the unusually
large number of wage-rate information cases might thus be eased.
"I would not require that the Union show the precise relevancy of the
requested information to particular current bargaining issues," he
stated. "It is enough for me that the information relate to the
wages or fringe benefits of the employees. Such information is obviously related to the bargaining process, and the Union is therefore
entitled to ask and receive it." " But this presupposes good faith.
Farmer declared that "this broad rule is necessary to avoid the disruptive effect of the endless bickering and jockeying which has heretofore been characteristic of Union demands and employer reaction to
request by unions for wage and related information." "l He concluded
that "wage and related information pertaining to employees in the
bargaining unit should, upon request, be made available to the bargaining agent without regard to its immediate relationship to the negotiation
or administration of the collective-bargaining agreement." 32 When
no bad faith existed a "limited remedial order" would be appropriate
which "requires only that the Employer, upon request, furnish the list
of individual wage rates of employees in the unit." "
Yet five years later, it could still be said by a trial examiner that
there was "an increasing multiplicity" of refusal-to-disclose cases, even
though the Board's decisions had created a "familiar and well-trodden
path." 3 4 Discovery situations are not novel; they are chronic.
23NLRB v. Yawman & Erbe Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 947, 949 (2d Cir. 1951).
2
4Aluminum Ore Co. v. NLRB, 131 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1942).
25 The Item Co., 108 N.L.R.B., 1634, 1635 (1954).
26NLRB v. J.H. Allison & Co., 165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S.

814 (1948).
California Portland Cement Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1436, 1439 (1952).
28 108 N.L.R.B. 1537, 1540 (1954).
27

Id.
Id. at 1541.
31 Id.
32 Id.
Id.at 1541-42.
3
4 General Analine Film Corp., 124 N.L.R.B. 1217, 1221 (1959).
29
30
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In the establishment of a properly balanced relationship between
arbitrators and the Board, it is important to realize that since 1947
the Board has been concerned with the vindication of rights which
blend public and private interests. "In short, we think that the
statutory pattern of the Labor Act does not dichotomize 'public' as
opposed to 'private' interests. Rather, the two interblend in the intricate statutory scheme." " In that connection, the Cox Panel found
the Board to be "largely an umpire engaged in enforcing established
rules first against one party and then against the other." 3" This is a
continuing development in which the Board is increasingly an enforcer
of collectively bargained commitments. In assessing the Board's relations with its hearing officers in contested representation cases, the
Cox Panel concluded that the Board ought to exercise its review power
only if "the case presents a difficult or important question of law or
administrative policy which the Board should decide .

.

.

."

The Board has actually been moving in that direction in regard
to arbitrators for some years. Twenty-five years ago the Board, in
Consolidated Aircraft Corp.,"8 was confronted with allegedly unlawful
discharges in January and April of 1942 which might also have been
contractual violations remediable under an existing arbitration provision. It dismissed the section 8(a) (1) " complaint on February 18,
1943, without prejudice since the parties conceded that the discharges
were arbitrable. The Board members felt that they ought not
assume the role of policing collective contracts

. . . by

attempting to decide whether disputes as to the meaning and
administration of such contracts constitute unfair labor practices under the Act. On the contrary, we believe that parties
. . . would thereby be encouraged to abandon their efforts
to dispose of disputes under the contracts through collective
bargaining or through the settlement procedures mutually
agreed upon by them, and to remit the interpretation and
administration of their contracts to the Board. We therefore
do not deem it wise to exercise our jurisdiction in such a
case, where the parties have not exhausted their rights and
remedies under the contract as to which the dispute has
arisen.40
35UAW v.

Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 220 (1965).

36

ADVISORY PANEL ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS LAW, REPORT TO SENATE
Comm. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE OF THE NA-

TIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BoARD,

[hereinafter cited as Cox PANEL].

S. Doc. No. 81, 86th

3T Id.at 9.
3847 N.L.R.B. 694 (1943).

39 NLRA §8(a) (1), 29 U.S.C. §158(a) (1) (1964).
40 47 N.L.R.B. at 706.

Cong.,

2d Sess. 5 (1960)
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Again in 1951 in Crown Zellerbach Corp. 1 it dismissed a union's
complaint of a unilateral change of a piece rate when new equipment
was installed; the union had failed to use "the grievance and arbitration
machinery." 4 The Board observed that it had "frequently stated that
the stability of labor relations which the statute seeks to accomplish
through the encouragement of the collective bargaining process ultimately depends upon the channelization of the collective bargaining
relationship within the procedures of a collective bargaining agreement." 4 3 The evidence actually showed a "background of a peaceful
and what appears to be a wholly salutary employer-employee relationship." There had occurred an employer's "isolated unilateral action."
Although "there is apparently no serious obstacle to an amicable
settlement of the issue through bargaining within the framework provided in [the] contract," the union had "failed to utilize the contractual
procedures established for bargaining concerning the interpretation and
administration of their contract." In reaction to that bargaining
environment the Board properly concluded that it would best effectuate
the statutory policy of stability of bargaining relations if it refrained
from issuing a remedial order and thereby putting itself, instead of
the bargaining parties, "in the position of policing collective bargaining
agreements, a role we are unwilling to assume."
The existence of the Crown Zellerbach pattern of a peaceful and
salutory bargaining relationship is typical of most discovery situations
that have resulted in Board proceedings. Tough bargaining should
not be equated with bad faith. When parties to collective agreements
probe and sometimes exceed the limits of the contractually allowable,
there is no reason for the Board to impale them on the timespan of a
Board proceeding. The military distinction between tactics and
strategy is useful here: the question should be whether there is a
tactical rather than a strategic refusal to disclose. The long-range
statutory policy of encouragement of good-faith bargaining is the
strategic concept to be effectuated by the Board. Tactical feints and
withdrawals by one or the other of the bargainers ought not automatically to be caught up in the Board's procedures as if they were
strategic assaults on the existence of the bargaining relationship. If
adversary bargaining is to succeed there has to be room for tactical
maneuver without involvement in the strategic confrontation of a Board
proceeding. The Board should not transform a tactical encounter
subject to arbitration into a strategic questioning of good faith bargain4195 N.L.R.B. 753 (1951).
42 Id.

43 This and all the remaining quotations in the paragraph are from p. 754 of the
report.
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ing requiring federal intervention. Many of the discovery situations
coming to the Board unfortunately are of that type. In others malice
may prompt the refusal to disclose but it still may more readily be
remediable in the NOW-proceedings of an arbitration.
The discovery situations that have concerned the Board indicate
that the nature of the problems, the Board's reactions to them, and the
traumatic timespan frustrating their resolution have remained remarkably consistent over the years. Thus, in Yawman & Erbe Mfg.
Co.,4" the employer refused to supply the union with a list of all
employees in the bargaining unit, their wage rates, and their job
classifications for the years 1946-1948. The union had been recently
certified. Certain members had made claims that they were being
underpaid in comparison with nonunion employees. In anticipation
of the expiration of the agreement, the union wanted to compare the
rates of nonunion employees in the bargaining unit. In the 1947
negotiations, the employer had refused to disclose that data for 1946.
Again, in 1948, it refused to disclose the 1947 data. The union apparently acceded to those refusals. The parties had commenced their
1949 negotiations before the agreement expired, and after several meetings, the union sent a letter requesting the information, which was refused again. It then filed a section 8(a) (5) 45 charge although the refusal occurred during the term of a collective agreement in which there
was an arbitration provision. While that charge was pending, the parties completed their negotiations and executed a new agreement,
although they remained at an impasse on the information demand
and refusal.
A year after the employer's refusal the Board issued its order:
Upon request, furnish Office Employees International
Union, Local No. 34, A. F. of L., with the names, positions
and current wages of the employees in the Unit described
herein, in order to enable [the Union] to discharge its
functions as statutory representative of the employees in the
appropriate unit.46
But the order was restricted to 1948 data, stating that the record
47
failed to disclose the relevance of the 1946 and 1947 wage information.
Of course, it was obvious that the recently certified union was simply
looking for proof of a pattern of discrimination between union and
nonunion employees in the few years it had been certified. As the
dissent saw it, the company had only itself to blame for any added
N.L.R.B. 881 (1950), enforced, 187 F.2d 947 (2d Cir. 1951).
NLRA § 8(a) (5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964).
4689 N.L.R.B. at 884.
4489

47

1d. at

882.
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burden in responding to the request for data covering all three years.
The dissent suggested a rule of accessibility for the Board to apply:
"So long as wage information of this character cannot be said to be
patently irrelevant, I believe the Union is entitled to it, subject, of
course, to the qualification that an employer should not be compelled
to provide information the furnishing of which would impose an impossible or unreasonable burden." 48
In the meantime, another yearly contract term had come and gone.
And the Board imposes no monetary penalty in this kind of case: it
has no statutory authority to assess damages for the wrongful withholding of bargaining data. Nor is its order self-enforcing. Contempt
proceedings to compel compliance can only result after violation of a
court's order enforcing the Board's. So a number of employers, as in
Yawman & Erbe, have felt that they might just as well play out the
string of review until the final appellate word has been spoken. In
that case, the court issued its enforcement order twenty-three months
after the employer's refusal to disclose.
The court declined to see any significance in the union's initial
failure to show the relevance of the requested information. Under
modern discovery procedures, the court observed,
information must be disclosed unless it plainly appears irrelevant. Any less lenient rule in labor disputes would greatly
hamper the bargaining process, for it is virtually impossible
to tell in advance whether the requested data will be relevant
except in those infrequent instances in which the inquiry is
patently outside the bargaining issue.4"
The disclosure dispute in Yawman & Erbe spanned two, perhaps
three, contract terms before the refusal was remedied.5" But the classic
case of intransigence and manuever is that involving the Boston
Herald-Traveler and the American Newspaper Guild."' In November
of 1951 the Guild requested the names of all bargaining unit employees,
their classifications, sex, dates of hire, birthdates, and salaries. There
were 520 employees in the unit, occupying 77 classifications, whose
salaries ranged from the contractual minimum up to $15,000 a year.
48 Id. at 885.
49 NLRB v. Yawman & Erbe Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 947, 949 (2d Cir. 1951), citing
4 J. MooPEx FEDERAL PRicricx 1063-65 (2d ed. 1953).
60The 1948 contract (#1) expired February 24, 1949. Assuming the parties
continued their one-year terms and stuck to the same effective date, the 1949 contract
(#2) expired on that date a year later. The Board's decision issued two months
later, April 28, 1950. The 1950 contract (#3) expired February 24, 1951. The
court's order issued a month later, March 28, 1951.
51 Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 627 (1953), enforced as modified,
210 F.2d 134 (1st Cir. 1954); Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 2097
(1954), enforced, 223 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1955).
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The newspaper refused to supply the information, arguing that the
Guild did not really need it. More important, it declared that the data
was confidential as to competing newspapers; the Guild's executive
committee included some members who worked for competitors of the
Herald-Traveler.
Three months later the newspaper refused to disclose any names
other than those of employees whose dues were not being deducted.
The Guild promptly filed a section 8(a) (5) charge. The existence of
arbitration as an alternative tribunal may be presumed. The new
collective agreement was executed in February, 1952. The intermediate report of the trial examiner followed in August, accurately
describing the confidentiality argument as having been "rejected in
numerous decisions." 2 At the outset of the next year, thirteen months
after the employer's final refusal, the Board issued its decision. It
ordered the employer "[u]pon request [to] furnish to the Union wage
data concerning work classifications and salaries of all employees in
said unit." "
When the newspaper refused to comply (as is its privilege), the
Board sought enforcement of its order from the First Circuit. Exactly
one year later, twenty-five months after the original refusal had
occurred, that court decreed that the employer must disclose the salaries
paid in each job classification and the number of employees receiving
each salary paid, but not the salaries paid to each individual employee.
The court reasoned that the Board did not intend that last piece of
information to be disclosed since it had not explicitly so required.54
Four months earlier the parties had begun negotiations over their
next contract. The Guild renewed its demand for the information. The
newspaper supplied most of it, but refused to disclose anything that
would enable the identification of individual employees. Three weeks
later the circuit court upheld the employer's refusal to do so in the
course of the earlier 1952 negotiations, not as a matter of substantive
law but because the Labor Board had not expressly required that
extensive a disclosure.
So the Guild then went back to the Board, filing its section
8(a) (5) charge in March, 1954. The parties, still out of phase with
the Board's disclosure orders, executed their new agreement in April
in an apparently expedited procedure. This time the Board's disclosure order was handed down within eight months; six months later
the court issued its unqualified enforcement decree.
52102 N.L.R.B. at 635.

102 N.L.R.B. at 629.
5 210 F.2d at 137.
53
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This record might suggest that the bargaining relationship between the Guild and the Herald-Travelerhad so seriously deteriorated
that the band-aid remedies of a grievance procedure would have to be
supplanted by the procedures that the Board utilizes in cases of
fractured relationships. Such a suggestion would be incorrect. The
trial examiner in the second case, finding a violation of the Act in
the newspaper's refusal to link wage information to individual employees, nonetheless added that "the picture would not be complete
if it were not noted that aside from the question herein considered, relations between the Respondent and the Union have been excellent,
and that there is no evidence of unlawful intent or act beyond what is
inherent in the violation found." 11
That last quotation teaches one of the basic lessons which has
emerged from this study. The Board must distinguish between allowable tactical bargaining maneuvers and proscribed strategic assaults
upon the integrity of the bargaining relationship itself. Excesses stemming from tactical maneuvers are remediable through the tribunal
created by the disputants. The Board will have to decide whether the
contractual tribunal can fashion the needed remedy without resort to
the statutory tribunal. In order to effectuate the purposes of the Act
in disclosure cases, the Board should keep its processes routinely aloof
from the tactical maneuver cases because it simply does not have at its
disposal the remedy of discovery. In the strategic assault cases, it may
be necessary to invoke the presence of the Board and the courts of
appeals; a deferral to arbitration would not then be sound.5"
57
In its second decision in the Boston Herald-Traveler litigation,
the Board emphasized that it had long since established (and the
courts long since approved) a rule under which "an employer is
required to furnish the Union representing its employees with the
name and earnings of each employee in the appropriate unit in order
to make collective bargaining effective." " Such information is obviously related to the bargaining process, and the union is therefore
entitled to receive it. 9
The Board emphasized that more was at stake than just the immediate contract negotiation. It rejected the Herald-Traveler's suggested dichotomy "between the Union's specific contract demands and
55 110 N.L.R.B. at 2106.

66 Even so, there will be many strategic assault cases in which it will be preferable
to use arbitration to compel a specific contractual compliance which, in turn, will satisfy
the needs of public policy expressed in the NLRA.
57110 N.L.R.B. 2097 (1954), enforced, 223 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1955).
58 110 N.L.R.B. at 2097-98.
59 110 N.L.R.B. at 2098, quoting Chairman Guy Farmer, concurring in Whitin
Machine Works, 108 N.L.R.B. 1537, 1540 (1954).
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its more general bargaining function." 60 To require undue precision
in the phrasing of the union's requests for information or of its reasons
for requesting it, the Board concluded, would simply cause the "endless
bickering and jockeying" earlier deplored by Chairman Farmer in
Whitin Machine Works." Furthermore, the argument that some
employees might wish to preserve their financial anonymity "rests on
but a speculative basis and, in any event, such individual desires must
yield to the interests of the great majority of workers represented in
the unit." 2 Similarly disposed of was the avowed desire of the
employer to preserve confidentiality for competitive reasons. The
Board reaffirmed its past holdings that, "in the face of the expressed
social and economic purposes of the Act, any possible risk that competitors may hire key employees does not justify an employer's refusal
to divulge pertinent wage information." 63 The Board's reasoning was
approved by the First Circuit, which observed rather curtly that employers had been ordered in "dozens of cases" to furnish detailed data
of the type asked for by the Guild.6"
While the Bostonians were engaged in the tactical intricacies of
their "excellent" relationship, Woolworth's Five-and-Ten in San
Bernardino, California, was bargaining with Retail Clerks Local 1167.
The Clerks had been certified to represent Woolworth's seventy employees on March 22, 1952. A week or so earlier, a two-year collective agreement had been executed. It contained a broad arbitration
clause, making arbitrable at the instance of either party any "dispute
.

.

.

as to the correct interpretation or application of any provision

of this agreement." 65 The agreement also provided for negotiation
of cost-of-living adjustments in 1953.
During the negotiations concerning those adjustments, the Clerks
requested the names of the seventy bargaining unit employees and
their individual wage, hour and classification categories because they
felt it was "imperative [to] have this information for the intelligent
and equitable administration of the Agreement." " The company,
however, refused to disclose the necessary data. Although the Clerks
could have filed a grievance in March (when the information was
needed for bargaining), they instead continued to negotiate and in
60110 N.L.R.B. at 2099.
61 Id.
62Id.

03

at 2100.

Id.

64 Boston Herald-Traveler Corp. v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 58, 61 (1st Cir. 1955).

65NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 235 F.2d 319, 325 (9th Cir. 1956), denying

enforcement to 109 N.L.R.B. 196 (1954), rev'd and order enforced, 352 U.S. 938
(1956).
6sF. W. Woolworth Co., 109 N.L.R.B. at 204.
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May accepted the company's wage proposal. Then, when the union's
last letter demanding disclosure went unanswered, it elected to file an
8(a) (5) charge rather than pursue arbitration. The trial examiner
heard the matter the following December, issuing his intermediate
report six weeks later, and concluding that the store had violated the
Act by its refusal. Six months later-seventeen months after the
final demand-the Board approved his conclusion, observing that
[t]he Board, with court approval, has consistently held that
an employer is under a duty to accommodate a Union's request during contract negotiations for relevant wage information .

.

.

. [S]uch duty continues after a collective-bargain-

ing agreement has been executed. The employer's duty, in
either instance, is predicated upon the need of the Union for
such information in order to provide intelligent representation
of the employees. When administering a collective-bargaining
agreement, the Union's need for current and authoritative
information is no less real than it was before the contract
was executed. r
Woolworth nevertheless refused to comply with the Board's order to
furnish the Clerks with the information requested. Almost two years
after the Board's disclosure order-over three years after the union's
final demand-the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce it. In setting
aside the order it observed that "the claim . . . condenses to no more
[T]here must under all
.'
than, 'Well, we might find something . .
.

the circumstances be a showing of reasonable need of the information to
meet a condition. If the reason is not obvious, then he who asserts
the claim should demonstrate to him against whom it is asserted some
relevant particularity." 68

But when the Board appealed the decision, the Supreme Courtthree years and several weeks after the wrongful refusal to disclosereversed in a one-sentence per curiam: "The Board acted within its
allowable discretion in finding that under the circumstances of this
case failure to furnish the wage information constituted an unfair
labor practice." '
The only possible reason not to compel disclosure in the Woolworth circumstances was the company's interest in the protection of
the privacy of its business operations. That interest, however, the
Board has consistently found to be subordinated to the policy of
7
encouraging good-faith bargaining. The courts have agreed. "
67 Id. at 197.
68 235 F2d at 323.
0 352 U.S. at 938.
7
4 See notes 62-64 supra and accompanying text.
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Chairman Farmer emphasized in Whitin Machine that the only
basis for refusal to disclose "pertinent bargaining information" would
be that the demand was a "harassing tactic." 7' The effect of this
reasoning is to shift the emphasis of scrutiny from why a union wants
the requested information to whether the employer will be unduly disadvantaged in complying with the request. This shift was evidenced,
for instance, in the J. I. Case Co. 2 dispute in 1958. During the term
of an agreement containing an arbitration provision, the union had
asked for existing wage data (time-studies) for "purposes of collective
bargaining and contract administration." 7 The company argued that
the union had no need for the information since no grievances had
been filed and no negotiations were pending. Before the trial examiner
it also pressed the defense of undue burden of compliance. The Board,
however, rejected both positions. It denied that the right to relevant
wage information was dependent upon the processing of a particular
grievance 74 and it found no evidence of undue burden. The union's
failure to demonstrate its need for the data was not evidence of harassment. 75 In addition, even though the time-study data was voluminous,
the Board noted that it was collected in centralized files and could
readily be made available to the union for examination or duplication.
All that was needed, it concluded, was for the parties to "enter into
reasonable arrangements" 76 for the transfer of the information. Therefore, almost seventeen months after the employer's refusal of the
union's request, the Board ordered disclosure.
When the employer refused to comply with the Board's disclosure
order, enforcement was sought in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. Ten months later-twenty-seven months after the refusalthat court ordered enforcement. It conceded that a bad-faith union
request for information could lawfully be refused. 7' But it rejected the
company's claim of general harassment as unfounded, basing its conclusion on a finding of the relevance of the data sought. It stressed that
collective bargainingis a continuing process which, "[a] mong
other things, involves day to day adjustments in the contract
and other working rules, resolution of new problems not
covered by existing agreements, and the protection of employee rights already secured by contract." .

.

.

The Union

not only has the duty to negotiate collective bargaining
71108 N.L.R.B. 1537, 1541 (1954).
72118 N.L.R.B. 520 (1957), enforced, 253 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1958).
73 118 N.L.R.B. at 522 (letter from union to employer).

74Id.
7. Id. at 523.

76 Id.
77 253 F.2d at 153.
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agreements but also the statutory 7obligation
to police and
8
administer the existing agreements.

Finally, as to the burden of disclosure, the court observed that even
had disclosure been burdensome, "some arrangement could have possibly
been made to lessen such burden." 7'
"Undue burden" may be said to require extreme circumstances to
be allowed to parry a thrust for bargaining information. It certainly
demands more of a showing than the crusty response of the employer's
general manager in Fitzgerald Mills Corp."° that management was
"busy trying to run a plant and could not furnish the information." "
The refusal to disclose occurred during contract negotiations; it was
one among several incidents evidencing bad-faith bargaining by the
employer. The employees struck for two months and the Board ultimately found that they did so in protest against the company's badfaith bargaining. That led to its order directing reinstatement of the
strikers without loss of pay, seniority or other rights, as well as back
pay from the date of the unconditional application for reinstatement
to the date of the employer's offer of reinstatement, less the striker's
net earnings during that period.

2

The tab for the back pay which was due about 160 employees
(legally regarded as "unfair labor practice strikers"), covering an
extended period of months, would certainly have been sizable enough
to encourage candor in the future. Unlike the employer whose refusal
to disclose results in no economic penalty other than the legal costs
of defense, an employer struck as a consequence of his refusal must
reckon with the prospect of being compelled to compensate his striking
employees.83 That prospect alone will often cause employers to prefer
an immediate arbitral resolution of whatever objections they may have
to the disclosure of particular information.
But curiously enough the employer's offer to submit the issue to
arbitration as an alternative to a Labor Board proceeding has been
78 Id.

79 Id. at 156.
80 133 N.L.R.B. 877 (1961), enforced, 313 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 834 (1963).
81 133 N.L.R.B. at 878.
82 Id. at 887.
83 "Unfair labor practice strikers" may be so regarded even though they may also
entertain economic motives in striking. See Butcher Boy Refrigerator Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
290 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. A. Sartorious & Co., 140 F.2d 203 (2d Cir.
1944) ; NLRB v. Stackpole Carbon Co., 105 F.2d 167 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
605 (1939). They must be rehired on demand. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB,
350 U.S. 270, 278 (1956) ; NLRB v. Sunrise Lumber & Trim Co., 241 F.2d 620, 625
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 818 (1957). If they are not reinstated, they are entitled to reinstatement and back pay from the date of demand, even though there may
have been other causes for the strike. See NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d
862 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576 (1938).
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rebuffed by the Board. Typical of its reasoning is the observation in
Sinclair Refining Co.84 that a willingness to arbitrate "is no defense to
a refusal to furnish information which a union needs in order to
enable it to bargain intelligently." ' The Board found an 8(a) (5)
violation and ordered disclosure.
The Fifth Circuit, however, rejected the Board's rationale. It
saw that the courts had previously assumed it to be proper for a union
to resort to section 8(a) (5) to enforce the obligation to furnish data."6
But this was due, in part, to "a mistaken reliance on the accepted
proposition that the decision of a private arbitrator, even though
ostensibly binding on the parties, cannot justify violation of the Act
or oust the Board of its rightful and exclusive power to effectuate the
policies of the Act." 87 To Judge Brown, it was specious to assume
prior to an arbitration that an arbitral award would be repugnant to
the Act. The second error he saw was "a misguided application of
another well established principle that a union's waiver will not be
implied, but must be clear and unmistakable." 88 But the waiver
assertion is either "meaningless" or "begs the question." The "right"
to the data can hardly be tested when it has not yet been determined
in arbitration whether such a right exists contractually. Section
8(d) " confers an abstract right to data for administering a contract,
but it is the specific contract itself which must determine whether there
is a "right" to the particular information requested.
Thus, the court held that an 8(a) (5) Board proceeding could
not be utilized to secure data for use in a grievance "where determination of relevance and pertinency requires determination of the critical
substantive issue of the grievance itself." " That was for the arbitrator.
And the court found it difficult to see how an employer's willingness to
abide by the arbitration provision could itself be deemed a failure
to bargain.
But unfortunately the court then moved vulnerably beyond that
sound premise. Not only was the Board to be precluded from asserting
its jurisdiction, but "resort to traditional court remedies" should also
be recognized as "one of two potential means by which this dispute
is resolved." Thus the courts, but not the Board, were to constitute
an alternative to arbitration "as a forum to achieve final resolution." 91
84 132 N.L.R.B. 1660 (1961), enforcement denied, 306 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1962),
disapproved in part in NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 437 n.5 (1967).
85
132 N.L.R.B. at 1663.
8
6 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 306 F2d 569, 574 (5th Cir. 1962).
8id.
at 574-75 (citing cases).
88 Id. at 575 (citing cases).

89 NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
90 Id.
91 Id.
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This alternative once again raised the unfortunate prospect of
judicial interposition of judgment in arbitrable matters which the
Supreme Court had previously disapproved in the Steelworkers
trilogy." In American Mfg. Co. 3 it expressed disapproval of the
New York Cutler-Hammer doctrine 1 4 under which the court determined if a grievance was meritorious and, therefore, arbitrable. The
Court described the doctrine as "a principle that could only have a
crippling effect on grievance arbitration." ' Thus, the courts are not
8 the Court exan alternative tribunal. And, in Acme Industrial,"
pressly disapproved of the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that the Labor
Board was "automatically" required "to defer to the primary determination of an arbitrator." "t In C & C Plywood,"8 the Court also
asserted the Board's primary jurisdiction and barred judicial usurpation of its power to respond to charges of statutory violations arising
during the term of a collective bargaining agreement.
However, this rejection of the view of the courts as alternative
tribunals, and the assertion of the primacy of the Board over both courts
and arbitrators, does not impair the utility of the main line of the
court's reasoning in Sinclair Refining. Judge Brown's major premise
was that the voluntary commitment of bargaining disputes to arbitration
should not be involuntarily displaced by Board procedures in refusalto-disclose cases. Disclosure cases are interim procedural disputes
between the contracting parties. They do not involve the resolution
of ultimate substantive issues under the agreement. Interim disputes
should be disposed of in an expedited manner. They should not be
prolonged by being subjected to the delay which inexorably characterizes disclosure disputes when they are taken to the Board in an
8(a) (5) proceeding. Judge Brown pointed to the time limits embodied
in the collective agreement and compared them to the cost in time of
''resort to the coercive sanctions of the Board," which had
brought the grievance machinery to a dead halt. In the
meantime, with inevitable delays in the administrative and
judicial review process, the second anniversary of the grievance of April 28, 1960, has taken place. Though the grievance is older, it is hardly wiser, and it is certainly no nearer
decision than it was when the parties first squared off."'
92 Cases cited note 3 supra.
93 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
94 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 App. Div. 917,
67 N.Y.S.2d 317, aff'd 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947).
95 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566-67 (1960).
96 NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
Q71d.

at 437.

98 NLRB v. C&C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967)
99 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 306 F.2d 569, 578 (5th Cir. 1962) (footnote
omitted).
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Beyond the problem of time lies the element of judgment. Whose
is the preferable first-instance judgment in these cases? Judge Brown
pointed to the fact that arbitrators jointly and voluntarily selected by
the parties have had committed to them "decisions having the most
profound impact upon the stability, survival and economic, financial
wellbeing of a business, its employees, or both. An adjudicatory body
. . .dealing with matters of transcendent substantive importance may
surely be trusted by the law to take steps which lawyers and Judges
would characterize as procedural to enable that tribunal to do its
work." 10' The court had no doubt that arbitrators could "fashion
suitable sanctions by which to acquire records, data, information and
evidence thought by the arbiters to be essential for a proper determination of the issue." 101

Furthermore if the union can "call upon an outside agency as the
weapon for discovery of information .

.

.

the whole proceeding is

necessarily disrupted." The dispute "then shifts from the plant to the
nearest Board hearing room, and thereafter to the nation's capital, and
then on to the seat of any one of the eleven Courts of Appeals having
geographical jurisdiction over the employer. Whatever else that is,
it is not giving full play to the means established by the parties." 102
In addition to the delay and the desire of the parties to localize
their tribunal, the court realized that an adverse psychological factor
was involved. The switch from the contractual to the statutory forum
"introduces or magnifies advocative hostility. For now a new adversary has entered the lists-the General Counsel who, from the
nature of the complaint, aligns himself with one of the adversaries-the
Union-but who as a sort of protector of the general public interest
must advance his advocacy, pro and con, not in the manner best calculated to bring an end to the dispute, but in a manner thought, from
that lofty vantage, to be best for the general good." Further along the
litigation route stands the Board, which first functions as the trier of
fact and law but then, after making its decision, must act as a prosecutor
to justify the decision in an enforcement proceeding in a circuit court.
To get the matter back where it started-arbitration-the employer
"must come to court. But the courthouse, says the Supreme Court, is
not the place to work out industrial disputes when arbitration has been
prescribed and is available." 103
100 Id.
101 Id. at 578-79, citing I. Hirst Enterprises, Inc., 24 Lab. Arb. 44 (1954)

(Justin,
Arbitrator); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 21 Lab. Arb. 367 (1953) (Dworkin,
Arbitrator); F. ELKOuRI, How ARBrrRATiON WORKS 181 (2d ed. 1960).
102 306 F.2d at 579. For a more extensive analysis of this division of decisional
power, see Jones, The Name of the Game is Decision--Some Reflections on "Arbitrability" and "Authority" in Labor Arbitration,46 "rEx.L. RE.--(July, 1968).
103 Id.
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Most of Judge Brown's reasoning is persuasive, and some of it,
incontrovertible. Although the Supreme Court properly disapproved
of that part of his analysis which provided for automatic displacement
of the Board's jurisdiction, our study of collective bargaining discovery
situations confirms the remainder. The conclusions here are that the
contractual procedures voluntarily established by the parties themselves
should be legally preferred, for disposing of disclosure disputes, over
the statutory proceedings of the Board, and that the Board should so
declare as a matter of policy. The Court in Acme Industrialhas given
it the option to exercise its expertise in this problem area.
These are delicate problems, which summon all the arbitrator's
skills. They are not susceptible of satisfactory resolution through
judicial proceedings independent of arbitration. On the other hand,
it makes good sense in effectuating the purposes of the Act to think
in terms of an interactive sequence of arbitrators as first-instance
tribunals, with courts immediately available (under rule 30(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) as superintending tribunals. The
Labor Board, guided by its Spielberg criteria of review," 4 is in any
event empowered to assure that the policies of the Act are effectuated
by any application of arbitral discovery.
Judge Brown's reasoning in Sinclair Refining contrasts with that
of the Sixth Circuit in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. NLRB.' °5 The
company had refused in August, 1960, to give the union its wage-rate
data, denying that the agreement required it to produce the data and
arguing that the union's remedy in any event lay through the grievance
procedure. Five wage-rate grievances were pending. Two went to
arbitration after the refusal. In each, the company refused to produce
the requested wage data unless the arbitrator ruled that the agreement
required it to do so. In one, the arbitrator ruled that the company was
not so obligated, and decided for the company on the merits. In the
other, a different arbitrator asked the company to deliver some of the
requested data to the union and the company complied. At the time of
the trial examiner's hearing on the union's 8 (a) (5) charge in February,
1961, the union was still studying the data procured through the second
arbitrator's ruling' 0 6 The trial examiner's intermediate report, recommending a finding of an 8(a) (5) refusal to disclose, was issued in
April, 1961, and the Board's decision adopting it followed in August,
104 Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955) : that "the proceedings
appear to have been fair and regular, all parties had agreed to be bound, and the decision of the arbitration panel is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of
the Act."
105 325 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1963), enforcing 138 N.L.R B. 15 (1962), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 971 (1964).
1o6 Timken Roller Bearing Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 15, 20-22 (1962).
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1962. That was two years after the rejection by the first arbitrator of
the union's discovery motion; it was a year and a half after the company
had complied with the second arbitrator's order to produce data.
That sequence is clearly undesirable. The employer was bargaining in manifest good faith, adhering to the arbitrators' decisions. Yet
both the trial examiner and the Board inexplicably found that Timken
was refusing to bargain in good faith. Finally, forty-two months after
the first arbitrator's discovery ruling, the court of appeals enforced the
Board's order, reasoning that the union had not relinquished its
statutory right to information in "clear and unmistakable" language,
silence alone in the agreement not sufficing for that purpose.107 The
company's position, even granting the union's right to the information,
was also that arbitration is the preferable tribunal in which to enforce
any disclosure obligation because the arbitrator can rule immediately
on the degree of disclosure needed to satisfy the union's needs. The
court, however, interpreting the bargaining agreement, concluded that
the union's demand, and the company's refusal, was not a complaint or
grievance within the meaning of the agreement and hence "the claim
of the Union for wage information and data was not an arbitrable
one." 108 Therefore, the company was not justified in basing its
refusal on the need to resort to arbitration. Four months later
certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court. After all this time, the
workers' grievances no longer had any contact with industrial reality.
But one had been resolved on the merits-in 1960-by arbitration,
exemplifying how all five should have been handled by the Board and
the court.
Timken Roller Bearing counsels the employer who wants discovery submitted to arbitration to get that "clear and unmistakable"
language to evidence relinquishment of the union's statutory right to
Board-court belated disclosure in favor of the NOW-remedy of contractual discovery. Ironically, of course, the company would have
prevailed in the Board proceeding had it not successfully resisted the
union's 1960 bargaining demand for inclusion of an arbitral discovery
provision.
Over the years, the Board and the courts have quite uniformly
enforced a duty to disclose. 0 9 The question at this late date therefore
is no longer whether an employer has a duty to divulge bargaining data
reasonably needed by the union in the administration of a collective
107 325
108

F.2d at 751.

Id. at 754.

109 Perhaps the broadest disclosure doctrine has been that articulated in 1954 by
the Eisenhower Board chairman Guy Farmer in Whitin Machine Works, 108 N.L.R.B.

1537, 1540 (1954)

(concurring opinion).
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agreement. The real question now is by which tribunal or combination
of tribunals discovery shall be effectuated.
Undoubtedly, most employers would regard silence as golden.
But they lost that option when the duty to bargain was forged by
Congress and hammered out in Board and court decisions linking them
to collective bargaining with unions representing their employees. So
it is in 1965 that a federal court can say to an employer, in CurtissWright Corp. v. NLRB," 0
Thus, unless the collective bargaining agreement both contains
a broad disclosure provision and the grievance and arbitration
provisions are also couched most broadly, clearly indicating
that demands for information are to be made through the
grievance and arbitration machinery, the existence of such
machinery is no defense to an employer who has refused to
supply relevant data upon a union request."1
The court found the agreement "silent as to a broad right of disclosure
which in turn might be subject exclusively to the grievance machinery
and arbitration." 11 So it concluded that the right to the requested
data was grounded in the statute rather than in the contract, and therefore "the Employer cannot demand that the Union use the grievance
machinery as its method of data accumulation.""'
The court in Curtiss-Wright could well have heard the still, small
voice of implied obligation speaking from the progressive step-structure
of the grievance procedure. It could have seen that the purpose of
compromise and settlement, which radiates from the procedure's
graduated steps, can only be attained if disclosure is candid on both
sides and comes at the earliest possible step of the procedure. What
was apparently inaudible in the quietude of the courtroom would come
through loud and clear to most arbitrators because of, rather than
despite, the din in the plant beyond the walls of the hearing room.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court in Acme Industrial showed that it
had not missed the point that collective bargaining would disintegrate
if grievances were either stifled through inaction or left unsettled in
significant number. The Court also saw the vital necessity for routine,
unlitigated disclosure if efforts to compromise and settle were to
succeed as a pattern. It has been evident for years that the viability
of American collective bargaining is in great part attributable to the
increasingly developed capacity of the industrial participants themselves
to compromise and settle most of their disputes. The Board is cer110 347 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1965), enforcing 145 N.L.R.B. 152 (1963).
111 347 F.2d at 71.
312

Id. at 72.

113 Id.
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tainly aware of this but has yet to make its archaic disclosure procedures responsive to it. As we shall see,-14 it has but one feasible and
effective option: channeling the NOW-problems of bargaining discovery
situations into resolution by the parties' own tribunal, arbitration.
Undoubtedly there is a sense among the courts and in the Board
that in these cases it ill lies in the mouth of a wrongful withholder to
argue that the undoubted power of the Board to compel disclosure
ought not to be exerted. But the fact is that the Board and the courts
could short-circuit such dilatory nonsense by simply adopting a rule
that disclosure cases must be arbitrated when contractually possible.
Effective good-faith collective bargaining would thereby be enhanced.
The temporary advantage to a few testy employers or unions would be
far outweighed by the ultimate strengthening of the bargaining process.
In truth, the employer who seeks to preserve his silence as long as he
possibly can would be dismayed at the prospect. On the other hand,
he must be carefully distinguished from the good-faith bargainer who
withholds information, yet thereby engages in bargaining through
tactical maneuver. If he is willing to have arbitration rather than the
Board-court procedure resolve the sensitive problems of management
prerogative, union rights, and undue burden which characterize the
discovery situations occurring during the term of a collective agreement,
his interest is entitled to protection.
Today, the employer who sincerely wants a discovery situation
resolved as soon as possible but is faced with an 8(a) (5) charge
should immediately seek arbitration (either of the underlying dispute
or of the disclosure demand itself) in order to forestall the Board proceeding. If the matter is scheduled for arbitration, it is quite likely
that the regional office of the Board will mark time pending completion
of the arbitration. Even if its processes were to follow the usual undelayed sequence, the employer would in most cases have the arbitrator's
decision either upholding its position or directing disclosure on
behalf of the union long before the Board's own consideration of the
matter, in all likelihood before the issuance of the trial examiner's intermediate report, and quite probably before the trial examiner has even
convened the hearing. If favorable to the union, the arbitrator's report
would (assuming the employer's compliance) make the matter moot
as to the Board. If the award is favorable to the employer, it would
be grounds for a motion to dismiss the proceeding. The proper disposition of that motion, of course, is one of the things this study is
about. The thesis here is that the 8(a) (5) charge should then be
dismissed so long as the arbitral award otherwise satisfies the Board's
114

See notes 126-50 infra and accompanying text.
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Spielberg criteria.-" If the Board were to adopt this approach it would
convert these embittering disclosure disputes into remediable arbitral
discovery situations.
The Board has not been equipped by Congress to resolve discovery
problems arising under collective agreements. The appellate provisions
of the NLRA subject the Board's section 8(a) (5) or 8(b) (3) disclosure orders to court review. Yet no penalty can be imposed by the
Board on an obdurate withholder other than an administrative fingershaking several years after the fact. This is far more embarrassing
to the questioner than to its adversary, since it dramatizes the former's
lack of bargaining power to compel compliance when it is both needed
and legally required.
There can be few actions more likely to undermine respect for
law than to be compelled by operation of law to wait several years
before seeing an adversary "ordered" (albeit with all federal
solemnity) to,
[u]pon request, furnish the Union with all information relevant to the grievances filed by the Union with respect to the
discharges of the above-named individuals."
That is the routine language of a Board disclosure order. This one
was issued after three discharges by Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company in the summer of 1963. After pre-arbitral grievance meetings had failed to result in a settlement, the union formally submitted
them to arbitration in December. By letter it then requested the
details on which the employer relied for its conclusion that the three
grievants had merited discharge, framing a number of factual inquiries.
The employer refused to supply the information, observing in part
that since "the Union has already submitted these cases to arbitration
under the contract, your request is obviously now academic." "" At
the hearing before the trial examiner one of the company's defenses
was that "the union's sole purpose in filing the charge herein was to
use the Board's processes for pretrial discovery in the arbitration
proceedings." "8

If so, the union's attempt was doomed to frustration from the
start. Although it had a quick remedy available in arbitration, the
union elected instead to grind out its request for information through
the Board-court procedures. This case is another good example of
the inexorable timespan of such Board proceedings. The discharges
had occurred in the summer of 1963; pre-arbitral grievance steps were
115 See note 104 spra.
116 This particular order is taken from Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 150 N.L.R.B.

1478, 1487 (1965).

117 Id. at 1482.
1'8 Id.
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completed on October 24; arbitration was invoked on December 6
for one grievant and on December 18 for the other two; the data on
the discharges was demanded on December 3 and 12, and was refused
on December 30; the first arbitral hearing was set for February 11,
1964.119 It would thus have been possible to make discovery motions
to an arbitrator in January or February since by then he had been
designated. Instead, the discovery situation festered until the middle
of the following June at which time a three-day hearing was held
before the Board's trial examiner; "0 his intermediate report was issued

on November 4, 1964; and the Board adopted his recommended disclosure order on February 1, 1965.21
Actually, that progression was more rapid than most. Only
thirteen months elapsed before the Board's disclosure order issued.
This has taken as long as thirty-nine months, although the average
is seventeen. 2 But what if Metropolitan Life had ignored the Board's
disclosure order, as it had a legal privilege to do? The Board would
then have had to seek enforcement. Almost half of the Board's disclosure cases must be taken to court for enforcement; in 84 per cent
of those cases the courts have enforced the disclosure orders; all of those
taken to the Supreme Court have resulted in enforcement of disclosure orders.
But what of the employees discharged almost three years ago?
Their cause, valid or not, would long since have withered in the legal
thicket. The household budgets of unemployed workers cannot
possibly cope with this skirmishing before someone has finally disposed
of the merits of their discharges. The available tribunals will have to
interact so as to give people like those employees their fair measure
when their rights are caught in a controversy requiring discovery for
its resolution.
The decision in Acme Industrial that the Board has jurisdiction
situations occurring during the term of a collective agreediscovery
in
ment has been thought by some to presage a more effective use of the
grievance procedure. Even a decline in resort to arbitration is predicted "as recalcitrant employers are advised by their counsel that
refusal to furnish information during the grievance process may result
in a charge and complaint of breach of Section 8(a) (5)." 12
119Id. at 1482-83.

120 Id. at 1480.
121

Id. at 1478.

122 See appendix, inmra.
12

Howlett, The Arbitrator,the N.L.R.B., and the Courts, in 20mT PROCEEDINGS OF
AcADEMY OF ARBrrRATORS 67 (D. Jones ed. 1967). Mr. Howlett is a

THE NATIONAL

lawyer, an arbitrator, and chairman of the Michigan Labor Relations Board. His
interesting paper consists of an extensive marshalling of authorities on the subject.
Interestingly enough, however, a show of hands at the San Francisco meeting indi-
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But in what way will the withholder suffer if he knows that a
Board proceeding will enable him to conceal the requested information
not only through lengthy Board proceedings but until a circuit court
enforces the Board's decree? When information is withheld to gain
a tactical bargaining advantage, it admittedly violates the Act; but
to the extent that it materially impairs the capacity of the wronged
party to administer the agreement, it also violates the typical collective bargaining contract. If this party elects to proceed through
the Board and the courts instead of through arbitration, it is actually
playing into the withholder's hands: his is the tactic of delay to postpone disclosure. The passage of time foreseeably alters many of the
elements of a bargaining situation. To the extent that possession of
the information sought by the requesting party will make its bargaining
more effective, going to the Board instead of arbitration locks it into
a time-consuming game of blind man's buff with an adversary of
unimpaired sight.
Of course, the bargaining relationship may have so far deteriorated
that the questioner really does not care so much about getting disclosure as it does about lacerating its adversary with legal cost and
inconvenience. The Board is likely to recognize that situation for
what it is and react to it accordingly.
The employer who wishes to bargain in good faith but not to
disclose faces now two possible forums (the Labor Board and the arbitration process), either successively or concurrently. Because of the
economic risk of an unfair labor practice strike,' he will often want
to arbitrate in order to resolve the extent of his obligation to disclose.
But he cannot safely do so until the Board adapts to a realistic sequence
of Board-arbitration interaction. Once this happens, problems of disclosure submitted to arbitration are quite likely to increase.
Of course, a union seeking discovery may elect to strike and hope
thereby to place a punitive cost on the employer. But it can do so
only theoretically, for such action is not effective in every case. The
Board may or may not find the withholding an unfair labor practice;
consequently, the strikers may or may not be entitled to back pay.'
If the Board or the reviewing court does not see matters the union's
cated that most of the arbitrators there present (about a third of the membership of
the Academy) did not share Mr. Howlett's conviction that arbitrators should seek to

effectuate the policies of the NLRA.

m See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956) ; note 83 supra and
accompanying text.

25 "The difficulties which the Employer now faces were not unknown when it
set out on its forthright but risky course of declining to bargain at all. For once the
strike is an unfair labor strike . . . the employer is compelled under the Act to reinstate the strikers upon application even though it means discharging replacements
hired during the strike." NLRB v. J. H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 245 F.2d 594, 598
(5th Cir. 1957) (footnote omitted).
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way, the strikers may be deprived of not only their lost wages, but also
their jobs. It is not likely that anyone will seriously urge that strikes
are a desirable discovery mechanism.
B. The Usefulness to the Board of Arbitral Discovery
The National Labor Relations Board should be not just willing,
but eager to exercise the discretion conferred upon it by Acme Industrial
to require first-instance arbitration, where available, as a condition to
resort to its procedures in discovery situations. Three major factors
point to this conclusion: first, arbitration is insulated from the pervasive judicial review built into the procedures of the Board; second,
the Board's caseload is constantly increasing; and third, arbitration
can resolve disputes in less than one-third the time required by Board
procedures.
1. Insulation From Judicial Review
The Supreme Court has consistently pointed out the patterns of
appellate review now prevailing in labor dispute resolution. From
these patterns can be drawn five major premises:
(1) Courts may not usurp the functions of the Board simply
because a contract violation may exist and arbitration is not available.
(2) The courts of appeals are obligated to review the Board's
findings of fact and conclusions of law to assure that the latter are
proper and that the former are "supported by substantial evidence on
the record considered as a whole." 28
(3) The Board has the power to defer to arbitration. In doing
so it exercises a superintending function and has the last word (subject
to judicial review as outlined in (2) above) on issues which are
susceptible to decision either by it or by arbitrators.
(4) Courts are not to displace an arbitrator's exercise of judgment on the merits of contractual disputes under the guise of determining what is arbitrable.
(5) Arbitrators have jurisdiction of even those alleged breaches
of contract which may also constitute unfair labor practices.
These premises lead to the conclusion that the Board can effectively
overturn an arbitrator's decision by refusing to defer to it; 127 but a
128 NLRA §§10(e), 10(f), 29 U.S.C. §§160(e),
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
127As

160(f)

(1964); Universal

pointed out above, see text at note 115 supra, an arbitrator's final decision

will frequently be before the Board when the latter is considering the proper forum
for adjudication of the issue.
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court, normally, cannot. Furthermore, arbitrators have the final word
so far as the courts are concerned as long as the Board refrains from
second-guessing the arbitrators. It is possible, of course, that some
courts of appeals will speciously conclude that an arbitral award, to
which the Board has deferred, is vulnerable to judicial reversal on the
merits because the award has become part of the "record" to be considered "as a whole" once the Board has deferred to arbitration. And
what of the converse? Would it be equally specious for the court to
review and displace a Board decision not to defer to an arbitral award?
An arbitrator's award, deferred to by the Board, preserves its
character as an expression of arbitral judgment without the administrative agency's "interpretation" superimposed on it. It should be no
less entitled to preservation from judicial interference after Board
abstention than it was before being brought to the Board.
The case is different if the Board refuses to defer to arbitration.
In assessing an arbitral award, all that the Board can legitimately do is
decide, (a) whether the pattern of events involved in the initial dispute
resulted in a contravention of the policies of the Act, and, (b)
whether the arbitrator's disposition of the case (viewed by the Board
objectively and regardless of his stated reasoning or apparent intent)
can be said to have corrected any statutory deficiency. The Board's
decision that an arbitrator's award is not consistent with the policies
of the Act is that kind of statutory policy assessment which the courts
of appeal have traditionally scrutinized. What the court then reviews
is not the merits of the arbitral award, but the Board's decision on
a question of law.
The legal and practical insulation of arbitral awards from judicial
upset is a major consideration in determining the relationship desirable
between the Labor Board and arbitration. This legal insulation was
traditionally conferred in many, but not all, state courts. In 1957 and
1960, deference to arbitration and arbitral awards was transformed by
the Supreme Court into a requirement of federal law binding in all
cases brought under the National Labor Relations, Act. 2 8 But aside
from judicial forebearance there has also been a practical phenomenon
of equal importance: the parties to labor relations disputes have shown
a marked disinclination to resort to the courts, either to fend off an
impending arbitration or to rectify alleged errors of arbitrators. For
example, the American Arbitration Association's analysis of its file
of labor cases for the year 1954 disclosed that of 1,183 cases only 12
128 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) ;
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ; United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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were ever contested in court-either to compel arbitration or to confirm or vacate awards.'In contrast, the Board's orders are frequently before the federal
courts, and the courts have not exhibited any reluctance to modify or
set them aside. In 1965, for example, 951 unfair labor practice cases
were closed by Board or court decision. Of that group, 540 were
closed after Board decision but before any court had issued a decree.
Decision by a court of appeals closed 359 cases."' Another 52 cases
required Supreme Court action. Thus, almost half of the Board's unfair
labor practice cases were subjected to judicial review. As we shall
see, 31' that typically adds at least a year to the decisional timespan of a
dispute. But what of the merits?
The only purpose here for inquiring how Board decisions have
fared in the circuit courts is to compare the immunity from judicial
scrutiny accorded the Board's decisions with the insulation assured to
the labor arbitration process. In fiscal 1965 there were 212 circuit
court decisions disposing of petitions to enforce or review Board
orders. 3 2 Of them 57.5 per cent of the Board orders were affirmed in
full. In the remaining 42.5 per cent the courts interposed their views
of the merits of the disputes by either modifying or setting aside
While 22 per cent were modified, and 17 per cent
Board orders.'
1M Procedral and Substantive Aspects of Labor-Management Arbitration: An
AAA Research Report, 12 ARR. J. 67, 78 (1957). Of the 8 awards contested, 3 were
vacated. In all 4 pre-award cases, arbitration was permitted to proceed, in 3 cases by
injunction so ordering and in the remaining 1 by the court's refusal to stay an arbitral
proceeding. Id.
In fiscal 1965, the Board closed
30 30 NLRB AxN. REP. 191 (Table 8) (1965).
15,219 unfair labor practice cases. 93.8 per cent were closed without necessity for
hearing a decision on the merits. Indeed 85.5 per cent did not even require the issuance of a complaint. Id.
31
' See Appendix infra.
13 2 Id. at 212 (Table 19).
L33 Id. The Board continues to show an increasingly good record in the courts
when viewed against its own history or that of other federal regulatory agencies.
But its record is poor indeed when compared with the almost total insulation-practical
and judicial--of arbitrators' decisions. In all fairness, it must be emphasized the
disparity is a structural handicap of the Board, imposed on it by the Act and the
Supreme Courts decisions. But it is nonetheless a real and presently inseparable
obstacle to its effectiveness in most discovery situations.
There are many examples available of the kind of judicial second-guessing experienced by the Board. E.g., NLRB v. Camco, Inc., 369 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966) ;
Raytheon Co. v. NLRB, 326 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1964). One suffices to illustrate
the problem. In NLRB v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 367 F.2d 781 (7th Cir.
1966), the Board had ordered reinstatement of an employee fired because she allegedly
spoke in a loud voice, used profanity, was offensive to her co-workers and had a poor
appearance and demeanor. She had never been warned about her objectionable
conduct before being discharged. The Board concluded that the lack of warning
vitiated the termination. A year later, the Seventh Circuit disagreed, refusing to
enforce the Board's order two and one half years after an arbitrator, in all likelihood,
would have ordered reinstatement. Had an arbitrator done so, that would have been
the end of it. The Seventh Circuit would have rejected the employer's effort to
vacate the arbitral award as staunchly as it had seized the occasion to vitiate the
Board's order.
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were set aside, only 3 per cent were remanded to the Board for its
further consideration.
The Board has been able to live with that review process. Arbitration would be destroyed by it, and the courts seem to have realized
this. But in regulating post-contractual relationships the Board has
yet to take full advantage of the opportunity to channel disputes into the
voluntary procedures set up by the parties for resolution of their
disputes. Nowhere is that more evident than in discovery situations.
2. Workload of the Labor Board
The caseload of the Labor Board has been rising relentlessly since
the Board's inception. During the decade 1945-1955 the Board's caseload rose from 9,738 to 13,391.1"4 And between 1955 and 1965 the
increase accelerated, the load more than doubling in ten years to
The Board expects 50,000 cases annually by 1975.13
28,025 cases."
In addition to this quantitative leap, a qualitative increase in workload
has been experienced because of the increasing proportion of unfair
labor practice cases. These tend to be more complicated than representation cases, requiring both more manpower and more processing
time. The only thing which has saved the Board from caseload collapse is the fact that more than 75 per cent of the cases are settled by
the parties.18 7 As the Board itself put it, "This elimination of litigation
from the labor relations scene relieved the NLRB of a potentially
mountainous workload." 188 That must certainly be viewed, however,
as a precarious administrative situation.
We can ill afford to continue under such circumstances. Clearly,
long-range measures for relief must be devised. In doing so, it will
be necessary to reinforce the tendencies toward settlement to the
fullest extent possible. But it is reasonable to assume that there
will be no legislative change regarding the relationship between the
Board, the trial examiners, the General Counsel and the regional
directors for several years. If changes are made, they are likely to
be in the direction of strengthening the role of the trial examiners; but
review would still undoubtedly be part of the examiner-Board-court
structure. The options open to the Board to cope with the prospect
of an overwhelming caseload are thus limited. There are only two
principal directions of jurisdictional development in which the Board
34
See NLRB ANN. REP. for years cited.
185See NLRB ANN. REP. for years cited.

1

136Digest of Address by H. Stephen Gordon, Associate Counsel of the NLRB,
at the Annual Conference of State Labor Relations Agencies, Honolulu, Hawaii,
August 9, 1967. Bureau of National Affairs, Labor Relations Yearbook-1967, at 151
(1968).
137 30 NLRB ANN. REP. 2 (1965).
138 Id. at 1.
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may look for long-range relief. One is promising: the encouragement
and reinforcement of the effectiveness of arbitration. The other is the
possible constriction of the Board's jurisdiction by its cession to the
states; that latter holds out little, if any, promise, and considerable
potential for conflict rather than stability in labor relations.
Jurisdictional withdrawal of the Board is not a viable method for
coping with the problem of increased caseload. The Board in the
past has experimented with reducing its caseload by promulgating
jurisdictional "yardsticks" geared to the dollar volume of the emThe trouble with the
ployer's involvement in interstate commerce.'
yardstick policy is that it can only relieve the Board's administrative
plight by casting thousands of "small" employers and their employees
beyond the pale of the Act's protection against secondary boycotts and
other federally proscribed union organizational and bargaining tactics,
as well as against unlawful employer pressures. Thus the yardstick
policy renders the most defenseless employers vulnerable to exploita-

tion. 40 That vulnerability encourages and propagates the very strife
and discontent that the NLRA is designed to ameliorate. Furthermore,
the yardstick cannot be administered with any precision because most
employers are massed at the lowest range of any measure based on
dollar volume or number of employees.
The Board's statistics demonstrate that the bulk of its business
originates among smaller employers. Of the unfair labor practice cases
in 1965, some 20 per cent came from employers with bargaining units
of 9 or fewer employees; a third of the employers involved hired fewer
than 20 workers; over half the employers concerned dealt with bargaining units of fewer than 50 employees; and two-thirds of the bargaining
Almost two-thirds of the
units were of fewer than 100 persons."
election cases closed by the Board involved units of fewer than 40
employees, almost half involved fewer than 20 employees, and a quarter

involved fewer than 10.
139See NLRB Press Release R-576 (Oct 2, 1958); 23 NLRB ANN. REP-. 8
(1958) ; 25 NLRB ANN. REP. 18 (1960) ; NLRA § 14(c) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1)
(1964). Initially, the yardsticks were aimed at reduction of the burden on the Board.

See, e.g., Haleston Drug Stores, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 187 F.2d 418 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951); NLRB Press Release R-342 (Oct. 6, 1950). But in
1954 the Republican majority members considerably tightened these yardsticks in an
admitted effort to achieve an administrative redistribution of federal-state economic
policy-making. See Jonesboro Grain Drying Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 481 (1954) ; Breeding Transfer Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 493 (1954).
140 State courts disposed to help these small employers or unions are powerless
to do so because of the doctrine of federal-state preemption. Guss v. Utah Labor
Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
14130 N.L.R.B. A.NN. REP. 210 (Table 18) (1965).
142 Id. at 208 (Table 17). One caveat in the use of these figures should be noted:
there is presently no statistical way to differentiate between the truly "small" employer
and the large one who may have one or several bargaining units. This is of course a
sociologically important distinction which the Labor Board could readily make available
if it would simply ask the question on its routine forms.
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There appears, therefore, to be little utility in the suggestion that
the Board respond to its ever-increasing caseload by constricting its
own jurisdiction. Since there is now no apparent prospect of congressional action to solve the Board's administrative dilemma, it seems
almost inevitable that the Board and the courts will react in part by
encouraging labor arbitrators to play an increasingly significant firstinstance role as a forum for the redress of grievances that may also
constitute statutory violations, but which arise during the life of collective bargaining agreements. Arbitrators could be effective in relieving the burden on the Board, thereby facilitating the elimination
of much of the delay involved in Board proceedings.
3. Time Required for Decision
The American Arbitration Association, in its 1957 study of the
1,183 labor cases in its 1954 file, 143 found that the typical arbitral award
was issued two to three months after the dispute was submitted to
arbitration.'" A 1958 study by Arthur Ross indicated an average
time lapse in 1955-56 of about six months from grievance to decision.' 45
More recently, the General Counsel of the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service reported in 1964 on a survey of about 250 cases
drawn at random from the FMCS files.' 4 6 The study indicated that
the parties consumed about three months (86 days on the average)
from the date of filing the grievance until requesting a panel of possible
arbitrators from the FMCS. It then took the parties another four
weeks (27 days on the average) to select an arbitrator and notify the
FMCS. About seven weeks (an average of 51 days) elapsed between
the arbitrator's appointment and the commencement of the hearing.
Ten weeks (73 days) were generally consumed between the date of
the hearing and the issuance of the decision by the arbitrator. Thus it
typically took five months to get the arbitrator's decision once the
parties had elected to go to arbitration.'4 7 Therefore, even including
the three months or so spent in processing the grievance from its
143 Procedural and Substantive Aspects of Labor-Management Arbitration: An

AAA Research Report, 12 AB. J. 67 (1957).
144 Id. at 77. Of the cases studied, 69.8% resulted from a contractually authorized
unilateral demand for arbitration; 30.2% were submitted by both parties. Id. at 68.
Cases decided in less than two months totaled 268, or 22.6%; 55.3% were decided in
less than three months; 84.2% in less than five months; 90.3% in less than six months;
and 99.4% in less than one year. Id. at 77.
145 Ross, The Well-Aged Arbitration Case, 11 IND. & LAB. REL. R-v. 262 (1958).
146 1 FLErrxm, THE LABOR ARBRATio N PROCESS 58 (1965).
14-tBoth the AAA and FMCS studies involved ad hoc cases, not reflecting the
timespan achievable with direct access to a permanent umpire. Robben Fleming's
study of FMCS discharge cases in 1951-52, 1956-57 and 1962-63 disclosed the significant
fact that by the end of the decade 1951-62, only about two weeks had been added to
the time required to get a decision once an arbitrator had been appointed. R FLEmING,
THE

LABOR

ARBITRATIOiq PROCESS

59 (1965).
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initiation through the pre-arbitral settlement efforts of the progressive
steps of the grievance procedure, the arbitrator's decision is typically
available in no more than eight months and may frequently be had
far sooner.
The contrast between the typical arbitral timespan and the time
required to dispose of Labor Board section 8(a) (5) cases of refusal
to disclose information is dramatic. The timespan for the latter procedure is set out in the tables of forty-nine cases in the appendix.
A study of those tables indicates that a Board decision in these 8(a) (5)
disclosure cases will be available, on the average, about 17 months after
the refusal of the requested information. It can take considerably
longer. Almost a third (15) of the 49 cases stretched on for 20 months
or more before a Board decision. Furthermore, Board orders are not
self-enforcing; no penalty is incurred under the Act for refusal to abide
by a Board order until the order is enforced by a court. Of course,
the withholding party is not apt to want to advance the moment of
compelled disclosure.
The average lapse of time between the wrongful refusal to disclose
and a court of appeals' decision is almost 30 months. The timespan
can be considerably longer. More than a quarter (7) of the 24 cases
involved a timespan ranging from 35 to 50 months. Six of the cases
involved Supreme Court action (decision on the merits or denial of
certiorari). Each of the six resulted in the enforcement of the Board's
disclosure order but only from 33 to 59 months after the original disclosure request had been refused.
While an arbitral award is normally issued within five months, it
takes on the average five and one-half months just to get the General
Furthermore, for all practical purposes
Counsel's complaint issued.14
the arbitral award must be regarded as final. 149 In contrast, 44 per cent
of the 8(a) (5) disclosure cases required court of appeals enforcement.
It should also be noted that a substantial majority of the disclosure
cases taken to the Board have a predictable end. Disclosure was
ordered by the Board in 81 per cent of the cases. Board orders for
disclosure are enforced in 84 per cent of the cases by the courts of
appeals and in our survey the Supreme Court enforced all of the Board
orders it reviewed.
At this point, it is fitting to recall Judge John R. Brown's epitaph
for the grievance in Sinclair Refining:
Resort to the coercive sanctions of the Board has brought
the grievance machinery to a dead halt. In the meantime,
148
149

See Appendix infra.
See text accompanying notes 128-29 supra.
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with inevitable delays in the administrative and judicial review
process, the second anniversary of the grievance of April 28,
1960 has taken place. Though the grievance is older it is
hardly wiser, and it is certainly no nearer decision than it was
when the parties first squared off.' 5 °
We have seen that the Board not only can, but should, defer to
arbitration for the resolution of discovery problems. We must now
turn to the arbitration process to see what procedural devices are
available to secure disclosure.
III
FASHIONING THE DISCOVERY REMEDY

Discovery situations may be few in number, but those few are
important. Unresolved refusals to disclose breed an atmosphere of
suspicion and insecurity corrosive of good-faith collective bargaining.
It is no argument to say that arbitration need not or ought not take
account of discovery situations arising during contract terms simply
because they are atypical. The fact that they are unusual situations
simply means that they require their own specially designed procedures
for resolution.
A. Informal Techniques
The employer and the union at odds in a grievance proceeding are
not litigants-they are adversary bargainers. They cannot merely fire
off salvoes of orders to compel depositions and interrogatories, engage
in the psychological warfare of a trial, and then simply walk their
respective ways after the decision. They must continue to bargain
tomorrow. Complete disclosure might help litigation reach a more
just result, but it would tend to frustrate the purposes of collective
bargaining. Measured disclosure is needed. The minimum amount of
intrusion needed to achieve the maximum amount of disclosure advisable in the circumstances must be gauged. 5 '
150 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 306 F.2d 569, 578 (5th Cir. 1962).
'51 Actual presence in the bargaining climate, as it is revealed in the arbitration
hearing room, is important for a decision-maker in discovery situations. A bargaining
relationship exhibits many symptoms. In considering a request for discovery an
arbitrator must draw upon both his past experience with labor disputes and his present
sense of what is needed and tolerable in the circumstances of a particular bargaining

situation.
Sinclair Ref. Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 732 (1963), is a good example of an arbitrator's
reaction in the context of a hearing. While the hearing was pending, the union demanded company records going back some 10 years relating to vacation pay and
possible past company practices. The company was willing to submit the discovery
issue to the arbitrator, but the union wanted the data prior to the hearing and charged
the company with undermining the grievance procedure. Shortly thereafter, it filed
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Even without judicial enforcement (in federal and state courts)
of arbitral discovery orders, there is much that a labor arbitrator can
do to encourage disclosure through arbitration. The arbitral discovery
process begins whenever either party to a collective agreement requests
and is refused information which it regards as necessary to the
administration of the agreement. The party seeking disclosure should
follow the usual grievance procedure established in the collective agreement. Typically, an aggrieved party would (1) file a grievance,
(2) process the grievance through the levels required under the
contract, (3) join with the other party in the selection of an arbitrator
if the grievance cannot be resolved, (4) arrange with the arbitrator
for a hearing date several weeks in the future and (5) write him
requesting that he direct disclosure in the terms and for the reasons
stated. The winnowing phenomenon, always present in dispute resolution, will cause a substantial number of disclosure problems to evaporate
at that point. Some telephone calls and perhaps some more correspondence will settle even more cases. It will still be necessary for the
arbitrator, in some cases, to make a more formal response to the
disclosure request. If, by then, he has become convinced that the
request is justified, he can direct disclosure in an interim award, to
become final and binding within several days unless the withholder
petitions him for a hearing on the scope or propriety of his discovery
order.1 2
If the discovery problem arises in the course of an arbitration of
a separate issue, a hearing on the latter issue will probably be convened
anyway. Quite often, matters in the nature of discovery are disposed
of effectively in the preliminaries which take place at the outset of this
a § 8(a) (5) complaint and, two weeks later, filed a motion with the arbitrator for
production of the records. After hearing argument, the arbitrator indicated that he
believed that the union's original request would have to be modified: substantially all
the records were unavailable for a period going back more than five years. The
arbitrator indicated that records going back about three years should be sufficient, and
suggested that the union proceed to show, through the evidence available to it, what
it alleged had been the company's past practice of which the union complained. Because
the union's records were necessarily sketchy when compared to those available to the
company, a detailed presentation was not expected; a prima facie case would require
the company to come forth with a detailed presentation in rebuttal.
The arbitral hearings in this case were completed in six days, eleven months
after the union's original demand for disclosure, and the Labor Board, dismissing the
8(a) (5) complaint, wisely (albeit reluctantly) deferred to the arbitrator's disposition
of the case.
152 This might be termed a "pre-hearing" function, but such a label would be
misleading. It is inaccurate to talk about "pre-hearing" procedures in relation to
arbitral discovery once the arbitrator has been selected, the question has been put
to him by the parties (or a court), and he has begun to hear argument or receive
evidence. At this point the arbitrator's "hearing" has already begun. Unlike a court,
which sits as an open-ended, continuing institution, the arbitrator's legal existence
qua arbitrator is coextensive with the grievance placed before him. Once he has
issued his decision he is, in that allusive legal phrase, fintwti officio.

1220

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.116:1185

hearing, without formally being identified as discovery situations." 3
The pretrial conference, commonly used by the courts,'-5 suggests a
hearing technique which has had utility for labor arbitrators. Parties
to a dispute frequently spend a considerable amount of time in the
course of a hearing establishing a set of facts through the testimony
of witnesses, only for it finally to become evident that a stipulation
at the outset could have saved most or all of the time involved.
Eventually, when the import of the testimony becomes evident to the
arbitrator (and often, to the adversary party), he will realize that he
might have been able to short-circuit the entire line of examination (on
occasion, even the balance of the hearing) simply by prodding the
parties toward an agreed statement of facts.
This waste of motion might easily be avoided through the use
of a similar technique in arbitration. It is simple enough to arrange
a private meeting between the arbitrator and the advocates, immediately
prior to the hearing, to plan the order of proof and explore the
possibility of stipulations of fact. It is not uncommon to find that the
advocates, lawyers as well as laymen,"' 5 have not really framed the
controverted issues in their own minds as they proceed to put in their
respective cases, if only because their clients have given them an incomplete picture of what the case is about and what the evidence, once
it is all in, will show. A good deal of time could be saved were the
arbitrator and the advocates to use some procedure that would enable
them to agree on the boundaries of the areas of dispute before the
hearing began. Thus, what the judicial system seeks to do through
its pleadings and pretrial procedures, arbitrators may be able to do
through this offstage preliminary meeting on the day and at the
location of the hearing.' 56 Even so, there will be cases in which there
1-53 Often management or the union will bring contested material to the hearing
in order to make it available should the arbitrator overrule objections based on its
materiality or confidentiality. Again, it is usually possible to proceed with the testimony of witnesses and the reception of exhibits, leaving material thus "discovered"
to be examined prior to reconvening at a later date, or simply to have reference made
to it in later briefs. On other occasions, the arbitrator may order that the information be made available prior to the filing of briefs, granting the discoverer the right
to respond to the disclosed material either by submitting additional material by mail
or by requesting a further session before the arbitrator to explore its significance or
it through testimony or exhibits.
to rebut
5 4
See generally Fee, Pre-Trial Conferences and Other Procedures Prior to
'
Trial in the Ordinary Civil Action, 23 F.R.D. 328, 331 (1959).
165 The utility of this preliminary confrontation should by no means be thought of
as limited to occasions when lawyers are the advocates. It can be fruitfully employed
by business representatives and industrial relations personnel in their presentation of
the case. Out of the presence of the grievance committee and the company staff, off
stage, where stridency and rigor are not part of the script, it is often possible to
thereby dismiss prospective witnesses no longer needed to establish what turns out to
be a conceded point, an undisputed document, or a stipulated pattern of events.
156 My own observation is that any prior reluctance to disclose the particulars of
proof and contention is markedly diminished on the day of hearing. The people are
assembled; there is really no time to fabricate checkmates to previously disclosed
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is a refusal to disclose despite the arbitrator's efforts to induce
disclosure.
It has been suggested that the arbitrator, "without benefit of the
power of a judge to compel discovery, can by indirection but with
propriety encourage it simply by evaluating the weight he is going to
give withheld evidence that ought in good conscience to have been
disclosed earlier." 167 The key word there is "earlier," since it posits
a belated proffer of information and the devaluing of its weight because
of its earlier withholding. But that kind of a sanction imposed upon
a party for pre-hearing nondisclosure is at odds with the sense of need
for wholeness which is one of the mainsprings of the arbitrator's judgment. A decision which is based on the downgrading or washing out
of withheld evidence which should have been disclosed earlier, but
which has now been credibly revealed, is not a decision on the merits.'
The philosophy of modem discovery quite properly rejected that kind
of consciously imperfect judgment. Trials are not to be "carried on
in the dark." 1' Much less so arbitrations in which the arbitrator is
commissioned to apply the parties' intent, not just a penalized portion
of it. It has been recognized that a system of justice, to warrant the
name, must "make a trial less a game of blind man's buff and more a
fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest
practicable extent." 160 It is as true of arbitration as of adjudication
that "[v]ictory is intended to go to the party entitled to it, on all the
facts, rather than to the side which best uses its wits." 161 The proper
function of arbitration cannot be served unless all the evidence available
proof; and there is a sense of final commitment to proceed with the hearing rather
than to maneuver a settlement.
This kind of pre-hearing, day-of-hearing meeting should not be construed as an
effort at mediation or compromise. Unlike a judicial pretrial conference, which is
scheduled well in advance of a trial date, this arbitral technique is really a housekeeping device to make the hearing more efficient. Forseeably, it will on occasion
in settlement. But that is neither its intent nor its likely result.
result
1 67
NATIONAL ACADEmY OF ARBITRATORS, PROBLEMS OF PROOF IN ARBITRATION 222

(D. Jones ed. 1967). See also Jones, Evidentiary Concepts in Labor Arbitration:
Some Modern Variations on Ancient Legal Themes, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1241 (1966).
This discovery technique is exemplified in the National Electric Coil arbitration,
66-3 CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDs 8897 (1966). Grievant had been discharged for
several specific reasons, one of which was "immoral conduct and indecency." The
union apparently requested company information concerning the grounds for this contention. The company's responses up to the time of the hearing were negative. The
arbitrator, at the outset of the hearing, granted the union's motion to dismiss that
charge, holding the company to have violated its obligation to disclose under the
grievance procedure. Id. at 6119.
148 Default judgments do have utility, however, when there is a failure to support
allegations with proof. See the effective use of this sanction in Jacuzzi v. Jacuzzi
Bros., Inc., 243 Cal. App. 2d 1, 52 Cal. Rptr. 147 (1966). As an instance of the use
of the concept of burden of proof for disclosure purposes see Brotherhood of Ry. &
Steamship Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 122 (1963) (burden imposed on union of
proving proportion of political expenditures to total expenditures).
159 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
160 United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
161 C. WRIGHT, FEDEaAL CouRTs 308 (1963).
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is brought into focus. Evidence that is discoverable, is available.
The lack, then, is not of the evidence, but of a remedy to produce it.
While informal methods are quite effective in securing disclosure,
they do not work in every case and there still exists the need for a
more formalized procedure of arbitral discovery. The remedy of
discovery is not commonly necessary, largely because in most collective
bargaining relationships the parties comply with the obvious intent of
the graduated steps of the grievance procedure.' 62 When followed,
those steps tend to produce adequate disclosure of the setting of the
dispute, the operative facts, and the positions taken by each side
concerning its resolution. Obviously, however, there will be recurring
instances in which persons will mistakenly or malevolently withhold
information which they should divulge. Realizing this, it then becomes
possible to devise the proper methods of forestalling the adverse effects
both upon the efficacy of their continuing bargaining relationship and
on the specific rights of the parties involved. The task thus becomes
one of structuring the arbitral discovery remedy so that it is possible
"to thwart . . . the protean ingenuity of those who would alternately

use discovery to harass and then resist all disclosure when their turn
came."

13

162 It is possible, of course, for bargainers to establish in their agreement a disclosure mechanism in addition to the normal steps of the grievance procedure. Where
the parties utilize a "permanent" arbitrator or umpire, a simple provision can be incorporated in the collective agreement. Where a pre-selected rotation panel of acceptable arbitrators is designated in the agreement instead of a permanent umpire, it
is simple to adapt to that circumstance. The arbitrator to whom recourse is available
can be designated as the one next in line for case assignment, by whatever means the
parties may normally determine that matter. This kind of provision would dispose of
discovery problems where there is already a named arbitrator or panel of arbitrators.
But what of the bulk of arbitrations-those submitted on an ad hoc basis to arbitrators
not previously designated?
Contractual anticipation of discovery needs remains the key. It would be simple
to put into a collective agreement a provision for discovery demand which would
refer the party seeking discovery to the nearest office of the American Arbitration
Association, to the Federal Mediation & Conciliation Service, or to the appropriate
state agency, in order to obtain a panel of arbitrators from which one may be selected. Were the AAA, the FMCS, or a state agency to establish a separate discovery
panel as an extension of its services, it could be comprised of the members of its overall labor panel. Experienced arbitrators who wished to do so could thereby make
themselves available to rule on discovery motions for parties whose collective agreements contained the suggested provision. Expense and delay could be diminished by
enabling the arbitrator, upon reference by the AAA, the FMCS or the state agency
to hear the parties in his office. The fee for the arbitrator's time and judgment could
be minimal, say $25 for an office ruling without a hearing, or $50 for an office hearing
held so as not to interfere unduly with his normal workday. A maximum fee chargeable could be established by the referring organization. The FMCS has just revised
its fee policy to enable panel arbitrators to designate their own maximum per diem
rate. 26 Fed. Reg. 9202 (June 21, 1968).
Should those three sources not be formally available for any reason, the party
who wants pre-arbitral discovery, and has not made express contractual provision for
it, will have to process the disclosure demand routinely through the regular grievance
procedure.
163 Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectate Pretrial Discovery, 58 COLum. L. REV.
480, 481-82 (1958).
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B. The Need for a "'Good Cause" Showing
Professor Louisell cautions that "Whenever we are in the area
loosely called 'discretion of the trial judge' it behooves us to struggle
for norms, so far as possible, that are objectively identifiable, observable,
and reasonable." "' Although no one arbitrator is bound by the
reasoning of another, except in a few unusual situations where the
contract so provides, there is a clear tendency among arbitrators at
least to be responsive to notions of the "typical" decision. This is
contractually justifiable because the parties bargain in the environment
of industrial relations; they form their expectations of reasonable
conduct, to some extent, in the light of prior conduct upheld by labor
arbitrators. But the correspondence of present expectations and past
decision is far from exact. It is possible to reach for Professor
Louisell's norms; but in doing so it must be realized that they are
norms of suggestion rather than compulsion. They are descriptive
norms, sociologically discernible from their acceptance by a number
of arbitrators; they are not the dictates of legal decision.
These norms afford only a limited degree of protection against
the possible abuse of arbitral discovery; other safeguards are required.
The standards required for discovery in a federal judicial proceeding
are not designed to meet the needs of the labor arbitration process.
The devices which have evolved to enable discovery by a party to a
federal judicial proceeding are limited in number, although broad in
range. " " With few exceptions, these devices operate without court
intervention and are triggered by the parties. The information sought
need not withstand any exclusionary test, but need merely be relevant
to the subject matter of the litigation and not privileged. "Good
cause," in most cases, need not be shown.166 Admissibility as evidence
is not required, but only that the information sought "appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." In administering arbitral discovery in collective bargaining, other notions
of exclusion unique to that process will have to be engrafted onto the
broad license to inquire granted by the Federal Rules. These requirements stem from the nature of the continuous process of collective
bargaining which binds together, but does not unite, parties to
grievance procedures in the daily negotiations which constitute the administration of the collective agreement. It is a living process and the
discovery probe must be applied with safeguards. Certainly, "good
MODERN CALIFORNIA DiscovERY
i05 See FED. M Crv. P. 26-37.
166 But see FED. R. Civ. P. 34-35.
164 D. LouisELL,

16

FED.

R. CIv. P. 24(b).

199 (1963).

1224

[Vol.11 6 :1185

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

cause" will be a minimal requisite, in contrast both to the Federal Rules
and to the Labor Board's construction of the disclosure provisions of
section 8(a) (5).
The needs of the managerial process require a different and more
cautious approach than the broad license to probe embodied in the
Federal Rules. Furthermore, the constituent nature of a labor union,
its political structure, means that discovery without "good cause" shown
would be unwise in those situations in which the union is the object
The underlying
rather than the initiator of discovery remedies.'
psychology looks much the same in either case. A certain amount of
inscrutability is needed on each side for an effective continuing
bargaining relationship to function.'"
C. The Need-to-Know Standard for Arbitral Discovery
In the federal courts discovery by deposition or written interrogatory is routinely granted when asked, unless the court is convinced
that the administration of justice will thereby be impeded. 1 0 In arbitration, however, that liberality of inquiry does not fit the peculiar
necessities of collective bargaining. Discovery ought not to be granted
by an arbitrator unless he finds specifically that it is needed to assure
effective collective bargaining in the circumstances.
Federal Rule 34, relating to discovery through the production
of documents, and rule 35, concerning physical and mental examinations, embody the more cautious standard of requiring that "good
cause" be shown to justify the discovery request. It should be applied
to all requests for arbitral discovery.
"Good cause" under rules 34 and 35 has been strictly applied by
the courts to prevent undue instrusiveness.' 7 ' One commentator observed of two decades of federal experience that "[a]lthough there
were certain exceptions, it is fair to say that, in general, good cause was
interpreted by the federal appellate courts as requiring a showing akin
to absolute necessity." 172
168 Cf. Meletron Corp., 36 Lab. Arb. 315 (1961) (E. Jones, Arbitrator).
169 For a more extensive description of the Federal Rules see Accretion, supra
note *, at 877-79. See generally 2A W. BARRON & A. HOLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE

(C. Wright ed. 1961).
1-72A W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 775, at
375 (C. Wright ed. 1961).
171 A recommendation has been made that the requirement of good cause be
dropped from rule 34, as being unduly rigid. ADVISORY COMm. ON RuILES FOR CIVIL
AN) PROCEDURE

PROCEDURE,

PRELIMINARY

DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS

PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED

STATES DISTRICr COURTS

TO

RULES OF CIVIL

31-32 (1954).

See Guilford

Nat'l Bank v. Southern Ry., 24 F.R.D. 493 (M.D.N.C. 1960), rev'd, 297 F.2d 921
(4th Cir. 1962).
172 Masterson, Discovery of Attorney's Work Product Under Section 2031 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 575, 582 (1963).
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Federal strictness is to be contrasted with the California Supreme
Court's more permissive view. It has defined "good cause" as that
showing which "will satisfy an impartial tribunal that the request may
be granted without abuse of the inherent rights of the adversary." 173
One commentator has observed that "[p]robably the only generalization which can be made as to the [California] court's present view of
good cause is that a need for an inspection is an element of good cause,
but only 'need' in a practical sense." "7 The court has also left the
determination of the need for discovery almost exclusively to the trial
judge. If he orders discovery, "the attempt to secure a review by a
prohibition proceeding is almost an exercise in futility, unless some
absolute privilege such as an attorney-client communication has been
violated." 5 But this is only a one-way discretion, since the reviewing
court will displace it if a denial of discovery is out of step with the
state's commitment to liberal disclosure." 6 In contrast, the arbitrator's
denial of discovery may well be warranted in the setting of the hearing
and the state of the bargaining relationship. The decision of an
arbitrator to refrain from reordering the situation despite his legal
power to do so should be insulated against activist judicial interference.
Sometimes the toughest but wisest choice is, as the bo'sun said, "to
set still and let the waves do the rockin'."
The Labor Board has recently indicated a measure of caution
which should also characterize arbitral discovery. In White Furniture
Co.,'77 the union negotiated for an increase in the customary Christmas

bonus. The employer refused, although not on the basis of financial
inability. Nevertheless, the union demanded the financial information
used to compute the bonus, the gross profits, business deductions,
salaries of officers, and other financial details. Concededly, all of these
could be said to be "relevant." In a routine federal discovery situation
the data would be discoverable. But discovery in labor disputes must
reckon the basic goal of national labor policy: encouraging the processes
of collective bargaining as an instrument for the relatively stable allocation of economic resources in major sectors of our economy. This
means that the discovery remedy should be calculated to achieve only
that disclosure needed so as not unduly to displace routine bargaining
tactics.
The Board in White Furniture prudently dismissed the 8(a) (5)
charge since the union did not need to know what it demanded in
173 Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Ct., 56 Cal.2d 355, 388, 364 P.2d 266, 283, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 90, 107 (1961).
174 See Masterson, supra note 172, at 588.
175
Id. at 589.
17 6 Beesley v. Superior Ct., 58 Cal.2d 205, 373 P.2d 454, 23 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1962).
177 161 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 1967 CCH NLRB Dec. fr 20,819 (Oct. 25, 1966).
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order to engage in bargaining under those circumstances. The Board
required the showing of a specific need for the information; otherwise, it
was the employer's prerogative to refuse to disclose such economic data.
When arbitration rather than the Board is invoked, it is reasonable
to conclude that self-interest in many cases will prompt disclosure in
order to avoid the risk of having the arbitrator react adversely to an
unwarranted withholding. It would be unusual for a party to refuse
an arbitrator's request for the production of a document or witness.
But it can happen, and without impropriety, as with evidence disclosing secret manufacturing processes or customer lists; possible
violations of law; matters which might be actionably defamatory;
financial data crucial to a competitive stance (presenting a prosperous
aura in the trade despite a financial pratfall). However one may view
the ethics of candor and deception in this context, it is true that niggling
and haggling are vital elements of negotiation. The need-to-know
standard, applied pragmatically, is the only criterion compatible with
the desire to interfere as little as possible with the dynamics of
bargaining.
Clearly, therefore, arbitral discovery is not comparable to a "fishing expedition." That latter is a speculation on the nature of the
catch. Arbitral discovery is not. The data involved here must be
precisely related to matters which are contractually cognizable in
arbitration. Indeed, the only fish to be snatched by arbitral discovery
from either party's pool of data should already have been put on the
hook through their collective bargaining. Protection against an unfair
arbitral discovery order may be afforded by the courts, federal or
state, functioning under the aegis of section 301 178 pursuant to Lincoln
Mills so long as interstate commerce may be said to be affected. As a
protective court
section 301 resource, Federal Rule 30(b) authorizes
9
orders and is applicable to all the discovery rules.
Its availability is indispensable to federal arbitral discovery. If a
disadvantaged person cannot obtain relief from an arbitrator ordering
discovery, relief must be available under rule 30(b) on motion to an
appropriate state or federal court. Since that court is then operating
under section 301, it will have to superintend the application of
arbitral discovery with the same sense of forbearance required by the
Supreme Court in other grievance procedure issues. The Supreme
Court's instruction to avoid judicial displacement of the exercise of
arbitral discretion is quite pertinent in discovery situations. It is easy
to charge that a particular order is "too broad" or "burdensome" or
178

LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. 185 (1964).

179 See the discussion in C. WRIGHT, FFzDRAL COURTS 320-24 (1963).
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"oppressive"; but a court should only vacate or modify an arbitral
discovery order on convincing proof of serious interference with substantial rights of the one seeking relief. The courts will have to be
wary of being put in the position of performing first-instance roles.
Arbitral discovery remedies will have to be carefully adapted to
the particular needs and temperaments of the parties in the light of
their particular bargaining relationship. They can themselves shape
and reshape the discovery remedy to suit their own views. Labor arbitration is by no means "a single, standard process, but a range of
processes that may vary with the enterprise and from case to case
within the same enterprise." In contrast, courts "would inevitably
develop uniformities or principles which would be applied to all enterprises.

.

.

.

They would become agencies of authoritative control

from above removed from the unique atmosphere of the particular
enterprise." ' 0
D. Guidelines for "Good Cause"
We turn now to an examination of some useful guidelines available in the federal practice to determine what might comprise "good
cause" for discovery in an arbitration.
1. Burden of Proof
First, the reasoning pattern characterized as "burden of proof"
may be helpful. As shown elsewhere,' it is deceptive to think of the
legal idea of "burden of proof" as a formula of exactitude in assessing
which litigant should prevail. But it has a rule-of-thumb utility. It
is a reminder that one who initiates a proceeding seeking to alter the
legal significance of a sequence of events-the "moving party"-must
82
persuade the decision-maker to set aside the status quo.

In arbitral discovery situations the burden of proof ought to be
borne by him who seeks the benefit of the order. The status quo
is normally the negotiated creation of the parties. No arbitrator should
upset that negotiated balance through a discovery award unless he is
convinced that such an award is compatible with the intent of the
parties.
2. Legal Compulsions
There are some legal compulsions affecting the exercise of arbitral
discretion in framing discovery remedies. First, discovery will be
180 Shulman, The Role of Arbitration in the Collective Bargaining Process in
ION 19, 24 (1949).
CoLL.cCTivE BARGAINING AND ARBUAr,
81
' See Jones, Evidentiary Concepts in Labor Arbitration: Some

Modern Variations on Ancient Legal Themes, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1241, 1283-85 (1966).
's2See id. at 1285, for the legal description of that common-sense proposition as
applied to labor arbitration.
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barred if it would intrude upon any matter on which the withholder is
privileged to remain silent. 83 The only specific limitation, other than
relevance, on the scope of examination under rule 26 is that one cannot
be examined regarding any privileged matter. The grounds of
privilege cognizable at a trial are applicable to discovery proceedings. 8 4
Second, discovery will not be tolerated by courts if either its
motivation or the foreseeable effect of its allowance is to cause someone
unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment or oppression; and "even very
slight inconvenience may be unreasonable if there is no showing of
need for the discovery sought." '18
That judicial standard has its corollary in the Taft-Hartley Act
in sections 8(a) (5), 8(b) (3), and 8(d), requiring good faith bargaining. Thus a proven instance of willful abuse of discovery, even
through the hands of an arbitrator, would be an unfair labor practice.
Nor should the presence of arbitration in the chain of events insulate
the wrongdoer from the Board's remedial action.
3. The "Work Product" Discovery Rationale
Discovery under the Federal Rules to some degree makes discoverable an opposing attorney's "work product," his preparation for
an impending trial. The "work product" is the material assembled by
a party's attorney in connection with his preparation to represent that
party in a pending action.
In Hickman v. Taylor'" the Supreme Court held that "the protective cloak of . .

.

privilege does not extend to information which

an attorney secures from a witness while acting for his client in
anticipation of litigation. Nor does this privilege concern the memoranda, briefs, communications and other writings prepared by counsel
for his own use in prosecuting his client's case, and it is equally unrelated to writings which reflect an attorney's mental impressions, conBut simply because an
clusions, opinions or legal theories." 18
attorney's work product is not privileged does not mean that it is
automatically subject to discovery. The Court did not issue carte
blanche access to the work product. Instead, the Court imposed the
requirement that any access be strongly justified by the one seeking
discovery of the work product. 88
183

See id. at 1286-96.

'8 4 See id.
185 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTS 323 (1963).

186 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
187 Id. at 508 (emphasis added).

188 In Hickmnai, access was denied. For the considerations the Court deemed
relevant to the determination, see id. at 510-14.
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But the work-product rules which have evolved under discovery
principles are peculiarly inapplicable to collective bargaining. It would
undoubtedly be regarded by both parties to a collective bargaining
agreement as an act of sheer lunacy for an arbitrator to tell an employer
or a union official that the notes he has made while investigating and
analyzing a grievance have to be turned over to his opponent to be
examined prior to an arbitration hearing. It would run directly
against the grain of thirty years of enforcement of the National Labor
Relations Act which has sought to preserve the independence of action
and judgment of the collective bargainers. The Labor Board has
always taken a dim view of intrusions into the internal decision-making
processes of either bargaining party.'8 9 This policy reflects the need
to maintain arm's-length collective bargaining among persons on both
sides of the table who quite often have no legal training. The administration of a grievance procedure is part of the negotiation process; it
is not litigation. It may indeed lead ultimately to an adversary
proceeding before an arbitrator, but it is designed and administered to
dispose of the great bulk of grievances prior to arbitration. Collective
bargaining would otherwise collapse. Judicial techniques like discovery
can have arbitral utility only so long as they are selectively adapted to
the needs and characteristics of collective bargaining. Ideas developed
in the evolution of some discovery techniques have obvious potential
utility; others would become malignant if transplanted. The Hickman
rule happens to be one of the latter. Even so, there are routine
bargaining situations in which access to working papers of an adversary
party may legitimately be sought. It is not unusual, for instance, for
the notes kept by one party as the minutes of grievance step meetings
to be demanded by the other as credibility evidence. Nor is it unusual
for an arbitrator (so long as such notes do not contain descriptions of
settlement negotiations) to require their production. Another common
example is a request for the production of the adversary's memoranda
or minutes reflecting proposals and counterproposals in the changing
course of contract negotiations where an issue of interpretation warrants
their receipt in evidence. These instances could be classified as workproduct cases were they to arise in the context of legal discovery. They
illustrate once again the highly selective nature of arbitral adaptation
of existing legal techniques. Although a set of rules comprising a
legal concept may be ill-suited for importation in toto to arbitration,
one or more of them may indeed be useful. This is simply another
application of arbitral pragmatism.
189 Compare NLRB, BuLL. No. 1,
TO ORGANIZE 14

GOVERNMENTAL PROTECTION OF LABoR's RIGHT

(1936), with 30 NLRB ANN. REP. 60 (1965).
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4. The Uses of Written Interrogatories
Under Federal Rule 33, a party may serve any number of interrogatories, containing any number of questions, "except as justice
requires to protect the party from annoyance, expense, embarrassment,
or oppression." A rule of reason applies to the claim of abuse 190 and
a labor arbitrator should have no more difficulty assessing the reasonableness of proposed interrogatories than he does in determining the
reasonableness of conduct in the myriad cases that call for that kind
of gauging. Under rule 33, objections to interrogatories must be
specific. 1"' General allegations of burdensomeness are not sufficient.' 92
More important, the burden is upon the objecting party to demonstrate
that a limitation on the number of interrogatories is needed to avoid
abuse. 93 It will not meet that burden simply to allege that research
or investigations will have to be made, or data compiled, or that the
information is as readily available to the interrogating party as to the
objecting one. 94
In applying the rule 33 obligation to "furnish such information
as is available to the party," the courts have evolved a standard for use
in assessing reasonableness. As Judge Holtzoff has observed, "interrogatories are not to be used in an oppressive manner. An adverse
party should not be required to perform burdensome labors or to
execute difficult and expensive tasks, in searching for facts and classifying and compiling data. A litigant may not compel his adversary to
Of course, the burden is considerably lightgo to work for him." '
ened, if not removed, when the adversary is given the right to inspect
records himself on a showing of "good cause" under rule 34. So it is
that it has been said to be an undue burden to require an adversary
to compile and correlate information where the adversary can have
access to perform the task himself.'96
An example of the kind of balancing needed is readily at hand in
the Sinclair Refining Co.'9 7 case.

There the union's request for in-

formation was prompted by layoffs and demotions due to a reduction
of forces which the affected employees felt was unwarranted. The
union submitted the employees' grievance and at the same time requested "all records that reflect or tend to reflect the amount of work
-90 Riss & Co. v. Association of Am. R.R.'s, 23 F.R.D. 211, 212 (D.D.C. 1959).
'l' Wolf v. United Air Lines, 9 F.R.D. 271 (M.D. Pa. 1949).
192 Hoffman v. Wilson Line, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 73 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
193 Hazell v. Pennsylvania R.R., 15 F.R.D. 282 (E.D. Pa.1953).
194 Bowles v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 4 F.R.D. 469 (W.D. Mo. 1945).
195 Aktiebolaget Vargos v. Clark, 8 F.R.D. 635, 636 (D.D.C. 1949).
196 H.K. Porter Co. v. Bremer, 12 F.R.D. 187 (N.D. Ohio, 1951) (not unreasonable burden in this case since the data was so complex).
197 132 N.L.R.B. 1660 (1961).
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hours for the separate jobs performed by the pipe department for
the past year to date. .

.

.

This information is needed so we can

intelligently evaluate this grievance with respect to settlement of or
further processing of same." ' The company responded that to do
so would impose an undue burden upon it. It estimated that 15,000
timesheets would have to be inspected; about 1,700 of them would
disclose the work performed by employees of the pipe department or
labor department; and that the 1,700 would then have to be collated
with 4,800 work order sheets to determine the nature of the work
performed by the employees whose 1,700 sheets had been pulled. The
trial examiner neatly disposed of the problem, rejecting the employer's
claim of undue burden, observing that "[a]s the Union appears to
have accepted this job by asking that the information be made available
to it I would deem it burdensome only to the Union and not to the
Respondent. The burden on the Respondent reduces itself therefore
to making materials available after working hours, the materials being
otherwise in use throughout the workday." -"
5. Mental and Physical Examinations
We have already discussed the standard of "good cause" applicable
under Federal Rules 34 and 35. The latter rule applies to actions in
which the mental and physical condition of a party is put in controversy.
It authorizes the court in which the action is pending to order him to
submit to a physical or mental examination by a physician. "Good
cause" must be shown, but the rule also requires the court to find that
the issue of the person's mental or physical condition has actually been
put "in controversy" in the pending action.
The courts have regarded the possibility of abuse of discovery
to be particularly enhanced when documents are demanded under
rule 34 and when a person is compelled to surrender his physical
privacy under rule 35 by subjecting himself to a physician's physical
or mental examination at the behest of an adversary party. The same
degree of caution is needed in arbitral discovery. It is not unusual for
an employee to be demoted or discharged because of his physical or
mental health °° It is also common for the reports of company doctors
to be submitted, and for employees to secure their own medical
reports to support their claims to unimpaired employment rights. Since
it is accepted that an employee must submit to reasonable physical
Id. at 1666.
'99 Id. at 1671. See Tree Fruits Labor Relations Comm., Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 516,
519, 526, 531-32 (1958), for greater volume of requested materials held by Labor
Board not to constitute undue burden.
2 00
See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
198
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examinations as an incident of the employment relationship, it is unlikely that an employer would normally need an arbitral order in the
nature of rule 35. But circumstances have occurred in which an
employer's action was taken without the benefit of a recent company
physical. The company may then wish to have an examination before
proceeding in arbitration in order to evaluate the health evidence relied
upon to support a grievant's claim. An arbitral order fashioned after
rule 35 may then be appropriate.
6. Sanctions to Enforce Discovery
There are recurrent instances of wrongful refusals to disclose information which put the adversary party to the expense of seeking to
compel disclosure. Must the wronged party be doubly wronged, both
delayed in receiving the data to which it is entitled, and at the same
That
time compelled to share the costs of righting the wrong?
galling prospect is characteristic of Labor Board proceedings in which
the wronged party feels that he must have the protective status of
an intervenor."' What of arbitration? We have seen that the violator
has all the cards stacked in his favor when he sits at the Board table;
he can keep them close to his vest until a court orders him to spread
them face up on the bargaining table.2 2 Time is indeed the friend
of the wrongdoer in the Board's refusal-to-disclose cases. Need this
also be true in arbitration?
Federal Rule 37 provides for court orders to compel response to
interrogatories, disobedience to such orders constituting contempt of
court. Although rule 37 does not in terms cover the case of incomplete,
evasive or false answers, the courts have uniformly held that a motion
lies to compel further answers where the answers given are felt to
be inadequate."° ' Although false answers to interrogatories have been
held not to constitute a contempt of court without a clear showing of
201

See Accretion, supra note *, at 845-46.
Mr. Justice Brennan has asserted that the device of pretrial disclosure should
be mandatory in every civil case because of its pronounced favorable impact on the
rate of settlement and the courts' dockets. More than any other reform in the New
Jersey court system, he feels its introduction was responsible for those salutary effects.
And it did it largely by throwing out the window the old advocacy, the
202

"close to the vest" approach and by requiring . . . disclosures . . . with the

result that our rate of settlement increased to the degree ... that not more
than one case out of every 5 ever actually gets to trial....
The biggest single obstacle in my judgment to acceptance of this technique and to full cooperation in making it work, is the old business of playing
the cards close to the vest, the way most of us grew up in the handling of
litigation for our clients. We did not like the idea of having to put the cards
upon the table before putting our witnesses on the stand.
Brennan, Introductory Remarks, Pre-TrialProcedurein ProtractedCivil and Criminal
Litigation, 23 F.R.D. 376 (1958).
2

03 2A W. BARON & A. HoLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACICE AND PRocEDuRE

(C. Wright ed. 1961).

§ 777

at 386
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perjury or of obstruction of justice, the courts have reasoned that a
corporation willfully falsifying answers, framing them so as to deceive
or mislead, or recklessly making them to resist disclosure, must bear
the costs of the interrogator for resort to depositions to secure full
and truthful answers."', It is only fair that the piper should pay the
cost of the tune he insists on playing.
A California procedure is helpful in resolving the problem of the
withholding collective bargainer. In the recent case of Weinkauf v.
Superior Court,"" the plaintiff in a personal injury action filed and
served interrogatories upon the defendant, but after nearly five months
received no reply. Plaintiffs then moved for a default judgment and
for reimbursement for the costs and fees of so moving. The trial
court both ordered the defendant to answer the interrogatories within
five weeks and directed his attorney to pay $500 as reimbursement to
the plaintiff for his attorney's fees and expenses. The imposition of
costs was affirmed by the California Supreme Court when the defendant's attorney sought a writ of prohibition to restrain the lower
court from enforcing its reimbursement order against him. The trial
court had concluded that it was the attorney's fault that the interrogatories had remained unanswered. In affirming the court's power
to issue such an order, Justice Tobriner observed succinctly: "To
accomplish the expedition requisite to successful discovery proceedings
sanctions may sometimes be necessary; it is not our province to nullify
them." 206
An arbitrator's order charging the wrongfully withholding party
with the entire cost of an arbitral proceeding to procure discovery in
a case of a willful and unreasonable withholding of requested information ought similarly to be sustained. This should arguably be so even
in the face of a contractual provision for sharing of the costs of
arbitration. The withholder should be disabled from relying on the
prospect of costliness to bolster his contractually wrongful conduct.
However, there will be occasions when the withholding is willful, but
still justifiable as a reasonable action to assure protective rulings by an
arbitrator to safeguard the confidentiality of the particular information.
Imposition of such a sanction would then, of course, be unwarranted.
7. The Subpoena Power
Since all responses to discovery demands under the Federal Rules
must be made under oath and are based on the subpoena power, it is
obvious that federal preemption doctrines could supply labor arbitrators
204 Crosley Radio Corp. v. Hieb, 40 F. Supp. 261 (S.D. Iowa 1941).
205 64 Cal.Zd 662, 414 P.2d 36, 51 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1966).
206 Id. at

665, 414 P.2d at 38, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
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with the power to administer the oath and the subpoena.10 7 If section
301 is read to enable resort to the Federal Rules,"0 8 or to confer the
power of administering the oath and subpoena by implication as necessary aspects of the arbitrator's "institutional competence," arbitral
discovery will be operative in all states rather than available only in
those states in which statutes so provide.
E. The Role of the Judiciary in Arbitral Discovery
The person against whom an arbitral discovery order may run
is assured the protection of the courts, federal or state, functioning
under the aegis of section 301 so long as interstate commerce may be
said to be affected. As a section 301 Lincoln Mills resource, rule 30(b)
of the Federal Rules authorizes court orders for the protection of parties
and witnesses ("deponents"), and the courts have made this safeguard
applicable to the discovery rules. °9 The availability of rule 30(b)
protective orders is indispensable for federal arbitral discovery. In
the event that a disadvantaged person cannot obtain relief from the
arbitrator's order, there must be access to rule 30(b) protection on
motion to the appropriate state or federal court. But that court,
operating under section 301, will have to superintend the application of
arbitral discovery with the same sense of forbearance required of the
courts with respect to other grievance procedure issues. The Supreme
Court's directions to the courts not to displace the exercise of arbitral
discretion is vital to arbitral discovery. Undoubtedly, it will routinely
be argued that a particular order is "too broad" or "burdensome" or
"oppressive," but a court should vacate or modify an arbitral discovery
order only on convincing proof of serious interference with substantial
rights of the party seeking relief.
Clearly, the courts should give substantial deference to the
arbitrator's order. The "institutional competency" of labor arbitration
is particularly needed to respond initially to arbitral discovery situations. These almost always constitute sensitive issues. Arbitral discovery remedies will have to be carefully adapted to the specific needs
and temperaments of the parties in light of their particular bargaining
relationship. Labor arbitration is by no means a "single, standard
process, but a range of processes that may vary with the enterprise
and from case to case within the same enterprise." In contrast, courts
"would inevitably develop uniformities or principles which would be
207 See Accretion, supra note *, at 876-77 n.191.
208 See id. at 877-85.
A reasonable motion to the court
209 C. Wuan T, FEDERAL CoURTs 320 (1963).

in which the action is pending by either a party or a person to be examined may be
made for a protective order under rule 30(b).
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applied to all enterprises .

.

..

They would become agencies of

authoritative control from above removed from the unique atmosphere
of the particular enterprise." 210
F. The Role of the Labor Board
The decision in Acme Industrial 2 1' indicates that the observations
of some commentators that the courts have lost confidence in the
expertise of the Board may be premature. In that case, the Court held
that the Board could take jurisdiction of 8(a) (5) disclosure cases
even though arbitration was available. The employer had argued that
the union should be denied access to administrative relief unless and
until it had exhausted its contractual remedy of arbitration. The
Court did no more than uphold the Board's jurisdiction. It might
have gone further to work out a pattern of interaction between the
Board, arbitrators and courts. It could have required Board deference
to arbitration or it could have advised the Board to study the question
of adopting a presumption in favor of deference until the processes of
the contractual tribunal had been exhausted. Indeed, the Board may
yet (and I would say, should) decide to do precisely that.
On balance, it was a sound course of judicial administration for
the Court not to have anticipated the Board's formulation, whatever
that may turn out to be. After all, the Board is an experienced and, on
the whole, quite competent administrative agency. The Court's decision permits the agency to work out its own accommodation of the
complex Board-arbitration relationship either on a case-by-case basis,
2 12
or on a dispute-pattern basis responsive to industrial realities.

But the Board now has the responsibility of assessing how disclosure may best be effectuated, through its procedures or through arbitration-or some combination of both. Factors which will have to
weigh heavily in the Board's assessment are the principal differences
between its processes and those of arbitration, notably: the extensive
involvement of the Board in routine judicial review procedures; the
differences in the respective time needed for final resolution of the
issues; and the power of the parties to select their own arbitrator,
whose capacities are responsive to their needs in a particular case and
drawn from the community of their own choice, in contrast to the
Board in Washington or an enforcing federal court wherever it may sit.
210 Shulman, The Role of Arbitration in the Collective Bargaining Process, in
BARGAINING AND ARBITRATION 19, 24 (1949).
211 NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
212The Court was undoubtedly aware of the cooperative studies of Boardarbitrator interaction undertaken by the Board and the National Academy of Arbi-

Couc

See PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL
AcAmY OF A~rrRATORS (1967).

trators.
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The Board will undoubtedly realize that there are discovery
situations in which the full panoply of progressively executed governmental powers will be needed in order to assure compliance with the
duty to bargain in good faith. But such cases are exceptional, generally arising from strategic attacks on a deteriorating bargaining relationship. These exceptions must not be confused with the far more
frequent, normal bargaining disputes about contract administration.
To these normal disputes arbitral techniques ought to be applied
rather than the long and cumbersome Labor Board procedures.
The prolonged Board procedures are heavily weighted in favor
of the recalcitrant party. Assuming that a party could elect to remedy
a refusal to disclose through the relatively short process of arbitration
and instead chooses to proceed through the Board and the courts, it
is actually playing into its adversary's hands. The passage of time
necessarily alters many of the elements of a bargaining situation. To
the extent that possession of the information sought by a party will
make its bargaining more effective, the choice of going to the Board
rather than to arbitration will lock it into a time-consuming game of
blind man's buff with an opponent whose vision is unimpaired.
IV
THE STRUCTURE OF ARBITRAL DISCOVERY

Even when the bargainers have no express contractual provision
concerning arbitral discovery, 13 it can constitute an expedited mech213 It is, of course, possible and preferable for bargainers to establish in their
agreement a negotiated disclosure mechanism in addition to the normal steps of the
grievance procedure. This is readily done. Whether the parties utilize a "permanent!'
arbitrator, a rotating panel of several arbitrators, or simply select an arbitrator on
an ad hoc basis, the following provision or something like it can easily be incorporated
in the agreement:
Provision for Discovery Demand
If one of the parties to this Agreement wishes to have access to information within the control of the other party concerning a grievance or dispute
arising out of the application or interpretation of a specific provision of this
agreement, the following procedure shall apply notwithstanding any other
provision of this Agreement:
(1) The party seeking disclosure shall state in writing (a) the specific information sought; (b) the contractual provision involved
in the grievance or dispute; and (c) why the information presently available to it is not sufficient to determine the validity of
the grievance or dispute. The statement shall be delivered to the
person designated to make decisions at the final step of the
grievance procedure prior to arbitration. The party from whom
disclosure is sought shall in writing within five days thereafter
grant or deny access. If it denies access, it shall state specifically
why it concluded the denial to be required.
(2) If the party seeking disclosure is not satisfied with the response
of the other party, or if no response is forthcoming, it may within
five days, and with written notice to the other party, submit its
original request, together with a letter indicating the nature of
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anism for obtaining contractually required disclosure of bargaining
information. Arbitral discovery can also provide the needed safeguards
against abuse, and can be effectuated through a sequence of interaction
among the three tribunals of labor dispute resolution-the courts, the
Labor Board, and arbitration--capitalizing on the institutional competence of each, as follows.
A. The Discovery Demand
1. The party aggrieved by a refusal to disclose information needed
to administer the collective bargaining agreement should invoke the
grievance procedure and should proceed to arbitration with its discovery demand.
2. Once an arbitrator has been designated in accordance with that
procedure, the aggrieved party should promptly contact him in writing,
sending a copy to the adverse party, stating
a. what specific information is wanted;
b. specifically why its disclosure is necessary as an adjunct
to the proper administration of the collective agreement;
and
c. by what procedure-oral examination (the deposition) or
submission of written questions for answer in writing
(the interrogatory)--it is proposed to accomplish the
discovery.
the response of the other party, to the arbitrator [designated by
whatever procedure the parties use] for his consideration. Should
either party so request, the arbitrator shall set the matter to be
heard at the earliest possible date. It is the intention of the
parties to use the least formality and time possible. No opinion
shall be written by the arbitrator; he shall render his decision
in writing within twenty-four (24) hours of receipt of the request or, if a hearing is held, immediately upon closing it. He
may direct the taking of depositions of designated persons, or the
submission and answer of written interrogatories, or the production of documents for examination and copying, or such other
relief as in the circumstances may be warranted to effectuate the
disclosure requested. He may also assess the costs of the proceeding against one or the other or both of the parties as appears
fair in the circumstances.
(3) Should the party from whom disclosure is sought believe that
the arbitrator's award ought not in justice to be effectuated in
whole or in part, it may, within five days after issuance of his
award and without penalty due to any other provision of this
agreement, seek a decision in a court to modify or vacate the
award to protect the petitioning party from undue annoyance,
embarrassment, or oppression. The court may assess the costs
of the proceeding, including reasonable attorney's fees, against
one or the other or both of the parties as appears fair in the
circumstances.
This procedure is also workable where a pre-selected rotation panel of acceptable
arbitrators is designated in the agreement instead of a single permanent umpire. The
arbitrator to whom recourse is available can be designated as the one next in line fori
case assignment, by whatever means the parties may normally determine that matter.
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3. Since the would-be discoverer bears the burden of demonstrating its need for the information sought, general conclusionary
allegations of need would be insufficient to warrant an arbitral order
to disclose.
B. The Discovery Response
1. Upon receipt of the discovery demand the arbitrator should
immediately contact the party against whom the demand has been
made, requesting it to send him a written statement indicating
a. its intention to comply with the discovery demand by a
certain date and in a certain manner; or
b. specifically why the arbitrator ought not to issue an
interim award ordering disclosure in accordance with the
terms of the discovery demand.
2. If the responding party wishes to have the arbitrator convene
a hearing it should so request in writing, sending a copy to the grieving
party, stating specifically why a hearing is necessary to dispose of
the matter.
3. The presumption is that discovery demands can properly and
finally be disposed of
a. in practically all cases simply through the exchange of
letters among the parties and their arbitrator;
b. with an office conference of the representatives of both
parties with their arbitrator occasionally being needed;
c. with the convening of a hearing being but rarely needed.
4. The arbitrator should strive to complete the discovery demand
proceeding as soon as possible. It is a proceeding which requires immediate attention. His order enforcing or denying the demand should
issue within no more than one week of receipt by him of the final statement of the respondent opposing the demand, whether by means of
a letter, a conference, or a hearing.
C. The Arbitrator'sDisposition
1. If the arbitrator denies the discovery demand, his written order
shall constitute a final and binding award which may be enforced
under section 301 in a state or federal court as a bar to any effort to
secure the same relief in a subsequent arbitration or before another
tribunal. The Labor Board should regard it as dispositive, subject
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only to 14
the application of its Spielberg criteria of review of an arbitral
2

award.

2. If the arbitrator orders disclosure, his written award should
also be final, binding and enforceable. But the party against whom
it is directed should have the right without contractual penalty (as,
for instance, the automatic waiver of a no-strike or no-lockout pledge)
to petition a state or federal court under section 301 to vacate or
modify the arbitrator's discovery order on the ground that
a. the subject matter to be disclosed is privileged against
compelled disclosure; or,
b. enforcement of the order, as framed, would result in
undue embarrassment, harassment or oppression.
D. The Court's Disposition
1. A court petitioned to vacate or modify an arbitrator's discovery
award (or to quash or modify his subpoena) should react to the
arbitrator's award with the same sense of forebearance required of it
under the Supreme Court's rationales insulating discretionary arbitral
judgment from judicial displacement. Particularly is this so of its
disposition of a claim that the arbitral order is so unduly broad as to be
oppressive. It should only vacate or modify the arbitral award, or
quash an arbitrator's subpoena, on proof of serious interference with
substantial rights of the party seeking relief.
2. If the court concludes that modification is necessary, it should
not institute the modification itself but should state why and in what
manner modification is needed and then remand to the arbitrator for
action not inconsistent with its decision. He should be enabled to
reassess the altered posture of the discovery order in the light of the
passage of time, the court's reasoning, and the collective bargaining
realities as thus recast.
3. The decision of the court of first instance, enforcing, modifying
or vacating the arbitral discovery award, should be held appealable as
a "final decision" 215 under section 301, or it should be subject to
correction by an appellate court upon the issuance of a prerogative
writ to review the lower court's action as an interim discovery order.
The choice of procedure for review should be left to the party affected,
so as to be able to avail itself of the more expeditious procedure
according to the jurisdiction in which relief is sought.
214See note 104 suPra.
215
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292 (1964) ; FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
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E. The Administrative Disposition
1. If the party seeking disclosure files a charge with the Labor
Board claiming a violation of section 8(a) (5) or section 8(b) (3),
the Board should neither dismiss the charge nor issue a complaint.
So as to preserve the charge from subsequently being barred by the
six-months statute of limitations, the Board should instead hold it in
abeyance pending the processing of the matter through the arbitral
discovery procedure.
2. Once the arbitral award has issued, and any judicial review
procedures have been completed, the complaint should only then be
issued or, if issued, sustained, upon a substantial showing that the
final arbitral disposition of the discovery situation does not effectuate
the policies of the Act.
3. The Labor Board should exercise its rule-making power to
declare that its procedure henceforth will be to channel contractual
discovery disputes through arbitration as a routine first-instance step.
It would retain the power in any event to respond to any unusual
circumstances indicating the need to superadd its own processes, as,
for example,
a. in cases of repeated refusals to disclose which are shown
to be not otherwise readily remediable through arbitration
because of the views of the courts of the jurisdiction in
which the action occurs; or,
b. in cases where the refusal to disclose is accompanied by
other unfair labor practices which must in any event be
remedied by the Board, and the refusal to disclose, therefore, cannot effectively be treated separately from the
other wrongful actions.
4. Judicial review of Labor Board dispositions of refusals to disclose should seek to effectuate the principles set forth in this study for
the establishment of an arbitral discovery remedy.
F. Discovery Absent an Arbitration Provision
Where there is no arbitration provision in a collective agreement,
but a grievance procedure exists, a party seeking discovery will have
to resort to a court under section 301 or to the Labor Board under
section 8(a) (5) or 8(b) (3). The Supreme Court in NLRB v. C & C
Plywood Corp.216 confirmed the jurisdiction of the Labor Board to
remedy unfair labor practices despite the existence of a collective
agreement enforceable in a federal court under section 301.
216 385

U.S. 421 (1967).
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Even under the doctrine of C & C Plywood, however, discovery
procedures will be available whenever arbitration is not provided for,
if the party brings his grievance to a court rather than to the Labor
Board. Inherent in the structure of the Labor Board is the necessity
for ultimate judicial enforcement of its orders, a factor which simply
eliminates it as an effective discovery forum. Thus, whatever limitations a court might be thought to have with respect to the interpretation of collective agreements, they are insignificant in discovery
situations when the Board, not arbitration, is the alternative forum.
V
CONCLUSION

The functional incapacity of the Labor Board to be effective in
discovery situations does not mean that its duties should, in whole or
in part, be committed to the courts. There is a continuing need for
the three tribunals-the court, the Board and the arbitrator-each
contributing its own special competence to the intricate processes
of collective bargaining.
There has been a significant and complex redistribution of
decision-making power among federal and state courts, the Labor
Board, and privately selected rather than publicly appointed arbitrators.
In execution, it has been a judicial rather than a legislative phenomenon.
In application, the emphasis has been on contractual standards bargained out by the individual disputants prior to the specific controversy
as each pursues his economic self-interest as he conceives it, rather
than on statutory criteria. The logic of this process commits to the
privately created forum of arbitration the great bulk of labor disputes
arising during the administration of collective agreements 21 7 There
are occasions during the terms of collective agreements in which a
party is seriously disadvantaged and the bargaining relationship significantly impaired by a refusal on the part of the other party to
disclose needed bargaining information. When arbitration is contractually provided for, the disadvantaged party has recourse only to
the Labor Board or to arbitration; courts are unavailable as a forum
for resolving the dispute. The Labor Board's disclosure procedures
are so woefully time-consuming as to be totally ineffective. That of
217

The process reserves for decision by the Labor Board and the courts only

those issues which cannot be resolved by the parties themselves through arbitration.
Such private resolution by the parties of their dispute without resort to the Labor
Board or courts may be impossible because (1) their bargaining relationship has
collapsed, (2) the interests of those not party to the collective agreement are involved
in the dispute and cannot fairly be resolved by the parties without the participation
of those affected, or (3) a paramount public policy is contravened by the private
solution.
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course means that the sole effective discovery remedy is to be found in
arbitration. Arbitral discovery is subject to review by the courts
under section 301 and there is an additional safeguard in the Labor
Board's competence to respond to abuses of the grievance procedure
as unfair labor practices. Thus, there should be initial resort to arbitration for the disclosure needed, backstopped only thereafter by the
courts' protective orders and the Board's condemnation of unfair
labor practices.
Arbitrators, in disputes affecting interstate commerce, should now
be empowered under the aegis of the Supreme Court's mandate in
Lincoln Mills to act under the appropriate Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as adapted to the needs of collective bargaining. Contrary
state statutory or common law should be preempted by the federal law
which governs the enforcement of arbitral commitments. Arbitrators,
by necessary implication as an attribute of their "institutional competency" created by section 301 as interpreted by Lincoln Mills,
should have federal authority to administer the oath, compel the
attendance of witnesses, the production of documents and the taking
of depositions for the purposes of discovery. 218 The necessary enforce218 A federal district court recently had occasion to determine whether the summary remedies of the Federal Arbitration Act, Title 9, U.S.C., are available in a suit
to compel arbitration under § 301. Machinists Local 967 v. General Electric Co., 282
F. Supp. 413 (N.D.N.Y. 1968). It upheld their availability, rejecting the company's
assertion of lack of jurisdiction both because of failure of the union to file a complaint
or issue a summons, and because it was "being deprived of the time limitations, discovery procedures and other orderly procedural and substantive protections of a plenary
proceeding under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. at 421. Citing the repeated use of various of the Arbitration Act summary remedies by the courts, it observed that the instant proceeding had been concluded within two and one-half months
from its commencement-"a sharp contrast to the time schedule of a plenary action
which 'would produce the delay attendant upon judicial proceedings preliminary to
arbitration.' John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 548 (1964)." Id. at 422.
But the district court, in rejecting that reasoning, appeared to regard itself as
bound to opt for one or the other set of procedures and therefore, impliedly, to be
precluded from resort to the one rejected. There is no doubt that the Arbitration
Act affords a far more expeditious petition procedure under § 4 than is available
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 3 provides that a civil action is
commenced by filing a "complaint" with the court whereas § 4 of the Act merely requires a petition with notice of motion which can then be heard and disposed of by the
district court with little consumption of time. Of course the thesis of this study is
that § 301 enables the courts, and the Lincoln Mills mandate requires them, to avail
themselves of the Federal Rules or the provisions of the Arbitration Act whenever
either proves a workable and helpful resource in fashioning § 301 remedies.
There simply is no need for an either/or choice between the sets of procedures
available. The Lincoln Mills mandate eliminated needless conceptual blocks:
[T]he substantive law to apply in suits under § 301 (a) is federal law, which
the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws ...
The Labor Management Relations Act expressly furnishes some substantive
law. It points out what parties may or may not do in certain situations.
Other problems will be in the penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some
will lack express statutory sanction but will be solved by looking at the
policy of the legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that
policy. The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature
of the problem.
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957). See Acretion
879-84.

1968]
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ment is available in state or federal courts by the party seeking the
benefit of the arbitrator's order, as is relief for the person aggrieved
by that order. But the initial issuance of the arbitral discovery order
should be within the discretion of the arbitrator, not the court.
The corollary of federal power is arbitral prudence. To assert
the existence of the federal power is by no means to insist upon its
use. A resource now exists, no more. Responding to the particular
circumstances put to him by disputants on a case-by-case basis, the
opportunity, but not the legal necessity, is now available for the
arbitrator to shape federal pretrial discovery techniques to the needs
of the arbitration hearing.
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APPENDIX
LABOR BOARD TIMETABLEa
Timespan in NLRB
j 8(a) (5) discovery
proceedings before
the Labor Board and
the federal courts

1
Bud's
Cabinet

Lewers &

Palm

Int'l

Cooke

Beach

Shoe

1. Grievable
refusal of data

6-5-64

8-7-64

10-24-63

3-20-64

2. Arbitration
provision?

yes

3. §8(a) (5)
charge filed

6-10-64

8-10-64

11-12-63

3-27-64

4. GC Complaint
issued

10-17-64

12-17-64

3-11-64

5-6-64

5. Total months
to thispoint

4

6. Trial Ex~r
Issued Report

6-1-65

5-25-65

11-5-64

11-3-64

10-14-65

7-22-65

3-24-65

3-15-65

2

7. Total months
to thispoint
8. NLRB's
decision
9. Disclosure
ordered?
10. Total months
to this point
11. Court of
Appeals decision
12. Disclosure
ordered?
13. Total months
to this point
14. Supreme
Court decision
15. Disclosure
ordered?
16. Total months
to this point

FEASIBILITY STUDY

LABOR BOARD TIMETABLE
Timespan in NLRB
§ 8(a) (5) discovery
proceedings before
the Labor Board and
the federal courts

5

6

7

Metropolitan

Acme
Ind.

Gen.
Elec.

1. Grievable
refusal of data

12-30-63

4-16-64

9-22-60

3-8-63

2. Arbitration
provision?

yes

yes

yes

yes

3. § 8(a) (5)
charge filed

1-2-64

5-7-64

10-4-60

3-8-63

4. GC Complaint
issued

3-26-64

8-24-64c

4-12-61

8-15-63

8
Puerto
Rico
Tel.

5

5. Total months
to this point
6. Trial Ex'r
Issued Report

11-4-64

10-7-64

7. Total mwnths
to this point

10

6

8. NLRB's
decision

2-1-65

2-1-65

9. Disclosure
ordered?

yes

yes

yes

10. Total months
to this point

13

10

20

10-6-65

4-27-66

11. Court of
Appeals decision
12. Disclosure
ordered?
13. Total months
to this point
14. Supreme
Court decision

1-9-67

15. Disclosure
ordered?

yes

16. Total moinths
to thispoint

33

4-1-63

2-3-64
11

12-16-64

11-20-64
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LABOR BOARD TIMETABLE
Timespan in NLRB
i 8(a) (5) discovery
proceedingsbefore
the Labor Board and
the federal courts

9

12

Employer's
Assn.

Anaconda

Fafnir

Celotex

1. Grievable
refusal of data

3-21-63

6-12-63

2-7-63

2-21-62

2. Arbitration
provision?

yes

3. § 8(a) (5)
charge filed

7-30-63

7-22-63

2-11-63

3-29-62

4. GC Complaint
issued

9-13-63

8-30-63

5-7-63

5-16-62

3-10-64

12-6-63

9-26-63

6-13-63

10-30-64

8-26-64

5-13-64

2-20-64

no

5. Total months
to thispoint
6. Trial Ex'r
Issued Report
7. Total nwnths
to this point
8. NLRB's
decision
9. Disclosure
ordered?
10. Total months
to this point
11. Court of
Appeals decision

6-17-66f

12. Disclosure
ordered?

yes

13. Total months
to this point

28f

14. Supreme
Court decision
15. Disclosure
ordered?
16. Total months
to this point

1]
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LABOR BOARD TIMETABLE
Timespan. in NLRB
j 8(a) (5) discovery
proceedingsbefore
the Labor Board and
the federal courts

13

14

15

16

Western.
Wirebound

Sinclair

CurtissWright

SquareD

1. Grievable
refusal of data

5-28-62

8-21-62

5-9-62

3-16-61

2. Arbitration
provision?

no

yes

yes

yes

3. §8(a) (5)
charge filed

10-8-62

9-26-62

6-18-62

4-13-61

4. GC Complaint
issued

5-17-63

2-20-63

11-20-62

6-26-61c

5. Total months
to this point

12

6

6

3

6. Trial Exr
Issued Report

10-23-63

7-2-63g

8-7-63

9-13-61

7. Total months
to this point

17

11

15

6

8. NLRB's
decision

2-6-64

12-30-63

11-21-63

4-29-63

9. Disclosure
ordered?

yes

yesh

yes

yes

10. Totalimonths
to this point

21

16

18

25

11. Court of
Appeals decision

1-19-66

6-8-65

5-4-64

12. Disclosure
ordered?

yes

yes

no

13. Total months
to this point

44

37

38

14. Supreme
Court decision
15. Disclosure
ordered?
16. Total months
to thispoint
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LABOR BOARD TIMETABLE
Timespan, in NLRB
§ 8(a) (5) discovery
proceedings before
the Labor Board and
the federal courts

17

18

19

20

Perkins

Union
Elec.

Great
Western

Timken

1. Grievable
refusal of data

4-19-62

7-14-61

6-6-60

8-1-60

2. Arbitration
provision?

yes

no

no

yes

3. § 8(a) (5)
charge filed

5-28-62

10-19-61

10-23-60

10-25-60

4. GC Complaint
issued

7-11-62

11-2-61

11-10-60

1-5-61

5. Total months
to this point

3

4

5

6

6. Trial Ex'r
Issued Report

10-25-62

7-23-62

3-29-62

8-4-61

7. Total months
to this point

6

12

21

12

8. NLRB's
decision

34-63

12-14-62

10-15-62

8-3-62

9. Disclosure
ordered?

yes

yes

yes

yes

10. Total months
to this point

11

17

28

24

11. Court of
Appeals decision

1-23-64

12-21-63

12. Disclosure
ordered?

yes

yes

13. Totalimonths
to this point

21

40

14. Supreme
Court decision

4-6-64

15. Disclosure
ordered?

Cert. den.

16. Total months
to this point

44
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LABOR BOARD TIMETABLE
Timespan in NLRB
§ 8(a)(5) discovery
proceedingsbefore
the Labor Board and
the federal courts

24

23

21

22

Waukesha

Hercules
Mtr.

Fitzgerald

Sinclair

1. Grievable
refusal of data

10-24-61

2-10-60

Nov. 1958

5-3-60

2. Arbitration
provision?

yes

yes

yes

yes

3. § 8(a) (5)
charge filed

10-11-61

2-12-60

6-28-59

9-12-60

4. GC Complaint
issued

11-14-61

5-16-60c

1-19-60c

10-27-60

5. Total nownths
to this point

1

3

14

5

6. Trial Ex'r
Issued Report

3-18-62

5-9-61

6-29-60

4-5-61

7. Totalimonths
to this point

5

15

19

11

8. NLRB's
decision

5-31-62

4-30-62

10-11-61

8-31-61

9. Disclosure
ordered?

no

no

yes

yes

10. Total months
to this point

7

26

35

16

11. Court of
Appeals decision

1-9-63

7-26-62

12. Disclosure
ordered?

yes

no

13. Total months
to this point

50

27

14. Supreme
Court decision

10-14-63

15. Disclosure
ordered?

Cert. den.

16. Total months
to this point

59
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LABOR BOARD TIMETABLE
Tintespan in NLRB
§ 8(a)(5) discovery

25

26

27

28

proceedingsbefore
the Labor Board and
the federal courts

Amer.
Stgar

Westinghouse

Gulf
Ati.

Gen.
Aniline

1. Grievable
refusal of data

Feb. 1960

8-13-58

1-6-59

3-31-58

2. Arbitration
provision?

yes

no

yes

yes

3. § 8(a) (5)
charge filed

3-2-60

11-12-58

2-5-59

-41

4. GC Complaint
issued

6-6-600

4-28-59

10-12-59

3-16-59e

9-22-60

5-19-60

3-14-60

5-20-59

2-23-61

12-1-60

9-15-60

10-15-59

5. Total months
to this point
6. Trial Ex'r
Issued Report
7. Total months
to this point
8. NLRB's
decision
9. Disclosure
ordered?
10. Total months
to this point
11. Court of
Appeals decision

6-12-61

12. Disclosure
ordered?

yes

13. Total months
to this point

29

14. Supreme
Court decision
15. Disclosure
ordered?
16. Total months
to thispoint

FEASIBILITY STUDY

LABOR BOARD TIMETABLE
Timespan in NLRB
§ 8(a)(5) discovery
proceedingsbefore
the Labor Board and
the federal courts

29

32
Berkline

1. Grievable
refusal of data

10-31-58

1-25-57

4-12-56J

6-7-55

2. Arbitration
provision?

no

no

no

yes

-i

3. §8(a) (5)
charge filed
4. GC Complaint
issued

1. L
Case

Am.
Smelting

Southern
States

7-7-55

1-26-59c

.

i

10-9-56c

9-12-55

3-18-59

8-20-58

11-26-56

10-27-55

9-2-59

4-9-59

7-8-57

1-13-56

5. Total months
to this point
6. Trial Ex'r
Issued Report
7. Total months
to this point
8. NLRB's
decision
9. Disclosure
ordered?

yes

10. Total months
to this point

7

11. Court of
Appeals decision

3-12-58

12. Disclosure
ordered?

yes

13. Total months
to this point

23

14. Supreme
Court decision
15. Disclosure
ordered?
16. Total months
to this point
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LABOR BOARD TIMETABLE
Timespan in NLRB
§ 8(a)(5) discovery
proceedingsbefore
the Labor Board and
the federal courts

33

36

Taylor
Forge

Avco.

1. Grievable
refusal of data

4-16-54i

7-23-53

2. Arbitration
provision?

yes

3. § 8(a) (5)
charge filed

5-21-54k

8-12-53

10-15-53

4. GC Complaint
issued

10-28-54

12-17-53

11-27-53

Oct. 1953

12-1-53c

7
3-15-55

6-23-54

7. Total months
to this point
8. NLRB's
decision

5-5-53
yes

5. Total months
to thispoint
6. Trial Ex'r
Issued Report

Woolworth

Utica
Observer

none

1-12-54

-8

8-16-56

2-18-55

1-5-55

7-20-54

9. Disclosure
ordered?

yes

10. Total months
to this point

14

11. Court of
Appeals decision

6-6-56

1-31-56

6-25-56

12. Disclosure
ordered?
13. Total months
to thispoint
14. Supreme
Court decision

12-10-56

15. Disclosure
ordered?

yes

16. Total months
to this point

43
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LABOR BOARD TIMETABLE
Timespan in NLRB
§ 8(a)(5) discovery
proceedingsbefore
the Labor Board and
the federal courts

37

38

39

40

Item Co.

Otis

Boston
Heraldo

Boston
Heraldo

1. Grievable
refusal of data

8-27-52

4-5-51

1-6-54

1-2-52

2. Arbitration
provision?

no

yes

yes

yes

3. § 8(a) (5)
charge filed

11-19-52

-

3-22-54

1-5-52

4. GC Complaint
issued

6-16-53

1-22-52

April 1952c

3-18-52

5. Total nmnths
to this point

10

9

3

2

6. Trial Ex'r
Issued Report

9-25-53

10-14-52

7-26-54

8-15-52

7. Totalimonths
to thispoint

13

18

6

7

8. NLRB's
decision

6-30-54

1-29-53

12-21-54

1-27-53

9. Disclosure
ordered?

yes

yesn

yes

yes

10. Total months
to this point

22

21

11

12

11. Court of
Appeals decision

4-6-55

11-10-53

6-6-55

1-28-54

12. Disclosure
ordered?

yes

yesn

yes

yes

13. Total-months
to this point

32

33

17

24

14. Supreme
Court decision

10-10-55

15. Disclosure
ordered?

Cert. den.

16. Totalmonths
to this point

SOm
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LABOR BOARD TIMETABLE
Timespan in NLRB
§ 8(a) (5) discovery
proceedingsbefore
the Labor Board and
the federal courts

44

41
Calif.
Portland

Hekinan

LelandGifford

.AutoLite

1. Grievable
refusal of data

11-28-51

8-29-51

5-16-50

6-15-49

2. Arbitration
provision?

yes

3. § 8(a) (5)
charge filed

11-30-51

10-1-51

4. GC Complaint
issued

2-1-52

2-15-52

1-29-51

1-3-50

5-15-52

4-29-52

4-25-51

2-10-50

yesP
8-17-49

5. Total months
to this point
6. Trial Ex'r
Issued Report

8

7. Total months
to this point
8. NLRB's
decision

12-29-52

11-26-52

8-24-51

5-8-50

9. Disclosure
ordered?

yes

10. Total months
to this point

11

11. Court of
Appeals decision
12. Disclosure
ordered?
13. Total months
to this point
14. Supreme
Court decision
15. Disclosure
ordered?
16. Total months
to this point

10-16-53

12-22-52

FEASIBILITY STUDY

LABOR BOARD TIMETABLE
Timespan in NLRB
§ 8(a)(5) discovery
proceedings before
the Labor Board and
the federal courts

45

46

47

48

Yaumnan

General
Controls

Cinn.
Steel

J. H.
Allison

1. Grievable
refusal of data

4-21-49

5-7-48

8-23-48

5-2-45

2. Arbitration
provision?

yesP

yesP

yesP

yesP

3. §8(a) (5)
charge filed

5-13-49

-

4. GC Complaint
issued

10-29-49

1-26-49

1-12-49

12-10-45

5. Total months
to this point

6

8

5

7

6. Trial Ex'r
Issued Report

11-23-49

8-8-49

6-13-49

2-8-46

7. Total months
to this point

7

15

10

9

8. NLRB's
decision

4-28-50

3-22-50

10-1949

8-26-46

9. Disclosure
ordered?

yes

yes

yes

yes

10. Total months
to this point

12

22

14

15

11. Court of
Appeals decision

3-28-51

1-26-48

12. Disclosure
ordered?

yes

yes

13. Total months
to this point

23

32

14. Supreme
Court decision

10-11-48

15. Disclosure
ordered?

Cert. den.

16. Total months
to this point

44
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LABOR BOARD TIMETABLE
Timespan in NLRB
§ 8(a) (5) discovery
proceedingsbefore
the Labor Board and
the federal courts

49
StatisticalComparison
Alum.
Ore.

1. Grievable
refusal of data

4-28-41

2. Arbitration
provision?

yesP

3. § 8(a) (5)
charge filed

9-6-41

4. GC Complaint
issued

9-8-41

5. Total months
to this point
6. Trial _Mer
Issued Report

Average

Median

Shortest

Longest

5.43r

5r

Ir

14r

11.19r

llr

4r

31r

17.37s

16s

7s

39s

29.83t

29t

17t

50t

45.50u

44u

33u

59u

12-10-41

7. Total months
to this point
8. NLRB's
decision

3-3142

9. Disclosure
ordered?

yes

10. Total months
to this point
11. Court of
Appeals decision

11-30-42

12. Disclosure
ordered?

yes

13. Total months
to this point

19

14. Supreme
Court decision
15. Disclosure
ordered?
16. Total months
to this point

FEASIBILITY STUDY

Footnotes to Labor Board Timetable
a Volumes 106 through 154 of the reported decisions of the NLRB, covering the
period 1954-1965, were searched for refusals to disclose during the terms of collective
bargaining agreements containing provisions for arbitration. Some 161 cases were
found involving refusals to disclose and of those, 38 occurred during operative arbitration provisions. Our survey of the timespan experienced in this type of unfair labor
practice case also adds a representative sample of 11 cases decided prior to 1954 and
reaching back to 1942, for comparative purposes. The citations of the cases tabulated
above with abbreviated names are listed next below by their identifying numbers:
1. Bud's Cabinet & Fixture Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1168 (1965).
2. Lewers & Cooke, Ltd., 153 N.L.R.B. 1542 (1965).
3. Palm Beach Post-Times, 151 N.L.R.B. 1030 (1965).
4. International Shoe Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 693 (1965).
5. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 1478 (1965).
6. Acme Indus. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 1463, enforcement denied, 351 F.2d 258 (7th
Cir. 1965), enforced, 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
7. General Elec. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192 (1964), enforcement still being litigated.
8. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 950 (1964), enforced as modified, 259
F.2d 983 (1st Cir. 1966).
9. Employer's Assn. of Building Metal Fabricators, 149 N.L.R.B. 382 (1964).
10. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 474 (1964).
11. Fafnir Bearing Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1582 (1964), tnion's motion. to intervene
denied, 339 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1964), rev'd sub noin. Local 238, UAW v.
Scofield, 382 U.S. 205 (1965), enforced, 362 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1966).
12. Celotex Corp., 146 N.L.R.B. 48 (1964).
13. Western Wirebound Box Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 1539 (1964), enforced, 356 F.2d
88 (9th Cir. 1966).
14. Sinclair Refining Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 732 (1963).
15. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 145 N.L.R.B. 152 (1963), enforced, 347 F.2d 61 (3d
Cir. 1965).
16. Square D Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 332 (1963), enforcement denied, 332 F.2d 360
(9th Cir. 1964).
17. Perkins Machine Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 98 (1963), enforced, 326 F.2d 488 (1st
Cir. 1964).
18. Union Elec. Steel Corp., 140 N.L.R.B. 138 (1962).
19. Great W. Broadcasting Corp., d/b/a KXTV, 139 N.L.R.B. 93 (1962).
20. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 15 (1962), enforced, 325 F.2d 746
(6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 971 (1964).
21. Waukesha Sales & Serv., 137 N.L.R.B. 460 (1962).
22. Hercules Motor Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 1648 (1962).
23. Fitzgerald Mills Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. 877 (1961), enforced, 313 F.2d 260
(2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 834 (1963).
24. Sinclair Ref. Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 1660 (1961), enforcement denied, 306 F2d
569 (5th Cir. 1962).
25. American Sugar Ref. Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 634 (1961).
26. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 129 N.L.R.B. 850 (1960).
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27. Gulf Ati. Warehouse Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 42 (1960), enforced, 291 F.2d 475
(5th Cir. 1961).
28. General Aniline & Film Corp., 124 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1959).
29. Southern States Equip. Corp., 124 N.L.R.B. 833 (1959).
30. The Berkline Corp., 123 N.L.R.B. 685 (1959).
31. 3.I. Case Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 520 (1957), enforced, 253 F.2d 149 (7th Cir.
1958).
32. American Smelting & Ref. Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 55 (1956).
33. Taylor Forge & Pipe Works Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 693 (1955), enforced, 234 F.2d
227 (7th Cir. 1956).
34. Avco Mfg. Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 729 (1955).
35. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 111 N.L.R.B. 58 (1955), order enforced, 229
F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1956).
36. F.W. Woolworth Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 196 (1954), enforcement denied, 235
F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1956), rev'd per curiam, enforced, 352 U.S. 938 (1956).
37. The Item Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1634 (1954), enforced, 220 F.2d 956 (5th Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 905 (1955).
38. Otis Elevator Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 770, enforced as modified, 208 F.2d 176 (2d
Cir. 1953).
39. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 627 (1953), order enforced,
210 F.2d 134 (1st Cir. 1954).
40. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 2097 (1954), enforced, 223 F.2d
58 (1st Cir. 1955).
41. California Portland Cement Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1436 (1952).
42. Hekman Furniture Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 631 (1952), enforced, 207 F.2d 561
(6th Cir. 1953).
43. Leland-Gifford Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 1306, enforced as modified, 200 F.2d 620
(1st Cir. 1952).
44. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1192 (1950).
45. Yawman & Erbe Mfg. Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 881 (1950), enforced, 187 F.2d 947
(2d Cir. 1951).
46. General Controls Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 1341 (1950).
47. Cincinnati Steel Castings, 86 N.L.R.B. 592 (1949).
48. J.H. Allison & Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 377 (1946), enforced, 165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir.
1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814, rehearing denied, 335 U.S. 905 (1949).
49. Aluminum Ore Co., 39 N.L.R.B. 1286, enforced as modified, 131 F.2d 485
(7th Cir. 1942).
b The collective agreement was extended 35 months by oral agreement.
e This is the date of the hearing. The date of the issuance of the complaint was
not indicated.
d Grievance procedure is mentioned but there is no specific reference to arbitration.
e The Board overruled the trial examiner's discovery order although it also directed the employer to bargain.
f After argument on November 30, 1964, the court of appeals denied the union's
motion to intervene in the enforcement proceedings on December 24, 1964. Fafnir
Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1964). The Supreme Court reversed
on December 7, 1965. 382 U.S. 205 (1965). The matter was then resumed as an
enforcement proceeding after an interval of 13 months devoted to the intervention
issue. That period is subtracted to arrive at the total of months consumed in the
normal processing of this case, and this for the reason that the intervenor issue was
a first-instance one of substance which cannot be regarded simply as a normal incident
of appellate jockeying to avoid a final resolution.
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g On March 23, 1962, the parties selected an arbitrator to dispose of several
grievances. On April 11, 1962, the union demanded the production of certain records
reflecting past practice over a period of years, so that it could prepare for the arbitration hearing. The company declined on May 2, 1962, and on June 12 declared it was
willing to produce whatever the arbitrator ordered. The union on August 6 insisted
that it needed the records to prepare its case. On August 21 the company repeated
its view that the union could submit its request to the arbitrator. On October 9, it
did so, and the parties argued the matter before the arbitrator on November 16, 1962.
He indicated that the matter could be handled according to certain guidelines at the
arbitral hearing which then was convened January 31, February 2, and March 9-12,
1963. Although it does not appear in the trial examiner's report or the Board's
opinion when the arbitration was decided, the hearings were completed and the discovery problem resolved by March 12, 1963, three weeks before the Trial Examiner's
hearing commenced.

h The complaint was dismissed "in view of the facts that the parties had agreed
to arbitrate the grievances and had selected the arbitrator; that the Respondent expressed its willingness to supply any data the arbitrator ruled was necessary; that the
Respondent did furnish data in accord with the rulings of the arbitrator; and that the
arbitrationhearings on the grievances in question were completed before the instant
case came on for hearing before the Trial Examiner." 145 N.L.R.B. at 733 (emphasis
added). The hearing before the trial examiner was held on April 3, 24 and 25, 1963,
eight months prior to the Board's decision.
I Doesn't appear in the case report.
J The date of the company's refusal is not indicated. This is the date of the union's
unequivocal demand for specified data.
k Or sometime prior to that date. The report is unclear when prior.
I The court of appeals was reversed by the Supreme Court which reinstated the
Board's disclosure order.
m Includes further litigation on motion to modify decree. The motion was denied
by the court of appeals on September 6, 1956, and certiorari was denied November 19,
1956.
n The trial examiner declined to find a section 8(a) (5) violation for the refusal
to allow the union to conduct an independent time-study on company premises. His
reason was that the union could obtain that remedy through arbitration. He did
recommend a disclosure order, however, relative to the apportunity to copy data from
the company's time-study file. The Board, in turn, held an 8(a) (5) violation as to
both items. But the court of appeals adopted the trial examiner's rationale, modifying
the Board's order accordingly.
0 The two Boston Herald-Traveler cases each involved a union request, in a unit
of about 520 employees and 77 classifications, for the names of all employees and their
classifications, sex, dates of employment, birth date, and salaries and extras paid them.
The course of this imbroglio, starting around November 23, 1951, spanned three contract terms. New agreements were executed on February 21, 1952 and April 16,
1954. The final court of appeals order came on June 6, 1955.
P The collective agreement was indicated to cover the usual subjects, presumably
including grievance and arbitration machinery.
q In this wartime decision in 1943 the Board, noting that the collective agreement
contained an arbitration provision, observed that it did not "deem it wise to exercise
our jurisdiction . . . where the parties have not exhausted their rights and remedies
under the contract as to which the dispute has arisen." 47 N.L.R.B. at 706. It accordingly dismissed the complaint without prejudice.
r Based on 48 cases. No trial examiner's report appears in Utica Observer, case 35
in the Table.
s Based on 49 cases.
t Based on 24 cases.
u Based on 6 cases.

